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RUSSIA & LEGAL HARMONIZATION: AN 
HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO IP REFORM AS 
GLOBAL CONVERGENCE AND RESISTANCE  
Boris N. Mamlyuk†
This Article examines several waves of intellectual property (IP) regulation 
reform in Russia, starting with a specific examination into early Soviet attempts to 
regulate intellectual property.  Historical analysis is useful to illustrate areas of 
theoretical convergence, divergence and tension between state ideology, positive law, and 
“law in action.”  The relevance of these tensions for post-Soviet legal reform may appear 
tenuous.  However, insofar as IP enforcement has been one of the largest hurdles for 
Russia’s prolonged accession to the WTO, these historical precedents may help to 
explain the apparent theoretical or political disconnect between the WTO and Russia.  
If Russian policymakers and many Western analysts agree that Russia has complied 
with all necessary structural adjustment reforms for WTO accession (including 
reforming its IP legislation), then we must search for deeper points of contention between 
Russia and the West.  One point of departure, I posit, is Russia’s lingering inability to 
convey adherence to general international law, broadly conceived.   
 
Thus, this Article re-conceptualizes this link between domestic and international 
legal orders by connecting the IP debate to broader debates over the nature of 
international law in the Soviet and post-Soviet space. Specifically, part one examines 
how Soviet theorists were able to reconcile (or not) IP regulation with Marxist ideology 
and socialist international law.  Part two surveys the main IP law reform projects in 
post-Soviet Russia from 1992 to 2006, with particular emphasis on harmonization 
with global legal standards.  The second part of this Article also provides a brief 
comparative analysis of Russia’s latest IP law (effective 2008) versus copyright 
protections in U.S. law and the 1971 Berne Convention.  The Article concludes with 
an overview of doctrinal debates within Russia over harmonization, WTO accession 
and international law.  These debates shed light on the development of local resistance to 
further legal harmonization efforts, an issue of immediate relevance not just for 
policymakers working with Russia, but for broader law and development debates.    
 
 † Visiting Scholar, Cornell Law School (2009-2010); Ph.D. Candidate in Law, Economics & 
Institutions, CLEI Centre, University of Torino, Faculty of Law; 2008-2009 Fulbright Fellow, 
Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences; J.D. (2005), University of California 
(Hastings).  I would like to thank the organizers and participants of the January 2010 Toronto Group 
conference and the January 2010 LSE/SOAS international law colloquium for their insightful 
comments and criticism on related presentations.  In addition, I would like to thank Michele 
Graziadei, Mitch Lasser, Chantal Thomas, Antony Anghie, John D. Haskell, Golnoosh Hakimdavar, 
Ugo Mattei, Asif Efrat, Gianmaria Ajani, Nikolay Mamluke and the participants of the Cornell 
Graduate Research Colloquium for their support and valuable friendship.  A special thanks to Prof. 
William E. Butler who gave far more time to our conversations at Penn State than I had any right to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has Russia finally ended its 
transition and completed its restoration/re-integration into the international 
legal order?  If so, has Russia developed a novel theory of international law or 
has it fully subscribed to the liberal international legal model?  In his 2003 
introduction to the second edition of G.I. Tunkin’s Theory of International Law, 
eminent Soviet/Russian law scholar William E. Butler notes that “there is no 
‘substitute’ or ‘replacement’ theory, as yet, to supersede the insights into 
international behavior identified by Academician G.I. Tunkin.”1  Taking as 
granted that Russia has not fully adopted a liberal theory of state and law 
along Western lines as most observers had hoped, it is worthwhile to 
reexamine the countless continuities and discontinuities between the Soviet 
and post-Soviet Russian experience with international law and institutions.  
Considering Russia’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy posture and 
growing uncertainty over the viability of domestic reforms,2
The present paper explores these historical breaks and continuities in the 
 it is vitally 
important to take stock of these difficult—and largely unquantifiable—aspects 
of Russian reforms, from the enduring legacy of great 
power/socialist/bureaucratic thinking still prevalent among Russia’s policy 
and academic elites, to more concrete issues like Russia’s attempt to project 
respect for property rights to potential investors.   
 
1 W.E. Butler, Introduction, in G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW xiii (W.E. 
Butler, transl., 2nd ed., Wildy Simmonds & Hill Publishing, Ltd., 2003). 
2 Dmitri Trenin, Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow’s Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 
2009); see also Boris N. Mamlyuk, Book Review:  International Law – a Russian Introduction (V.I. 
Kuznetsov, B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, eds.), 35 REV. OF CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN LAW (2010) 
(forthcoming). 
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context of Russia’s intellectual property reforms.3  The analysis follows two 
parts.  The first section offers a brief legal history of Soviet regulation of 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights, starting in the early 1920s when the Soviet 
state was first engineering its socialist legal system in an apparent attempt to 
break away from the global “bourgeois” legal order.  The first section also 
provides an overview of the ‘mature’ or classic Soviet IP regime.  Section two 
presents a synopsis of IP law reform projects in post-Soviet Russia and 
Russia’s attempts to harmonize its IP legislation with international norms 
throughout the 1990s.  Next, employing a traditional functionalist 
comparative law methodology,4
I 
 section four compares Russia’s subsequent IP 
law reforms to U.S. copyright law, particularly in reference to legal licenses or 
‘fair-use.’  The paper concludes with a broader discussion on the effectiveness 
of Russia’s attempts to harmonize its domestic IP system with international 
norms, including a study of resistance.  This in turn allows us to evaluate 
alternative policy options or alternative normative approaches to law reform 
and law and development projects not just in Russia, but in other transitioning 
states. 
EARLY SOVIET IP PROTECTION:  THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. Why Turn So Far to History? 
Most historical studies looking at IP reform in post-Soviet Russia start 
with the classic or late Soviet period (1960-1989) as a point of departure.5
 
3 This paper is Chapter 6 of a larger dissertation on the development of international legal 
theory in Russia during two moments of crisis, the Interwar period (1919-1939) and the post-Soviet 
period (1989-2009).    
  
This is a useful starting place.  However, the early Soviet period—the Interwar 
years of 1919-1939—can offer a remarkably sophisticated complimentary 
analytical frame for considering the inner tensions and incongruities of Soviet 
legal theory and practice.  How the USSR came to recognize IP rights despite 
openly professing to oppose ‘private property’ (and any laws that upheld the 
right of ownership to the means of production) may shed further light on the 
ambivalent intellectual structures of Soviet law, and by legacy, the post-Soviet 
4 Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:  TRADITIONS 
AND TRANSITIONS 104-108 (Pierre Legrand, Roderick Munday, eds., Cambridge, 2003); Mary Ann 
Glendon, Michael W. Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 11-12 
(2nd ed., West, 1994).  On functionalism more broadly, see the classic Robert K. Merton, Manifest and 
Latent Functions, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (Free Press, 1957).     
5 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
xvi (4th ed., London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2005).  The notable exception in this regard is Michiel 
Elst’s comprehensive historical study.  See MICHIEL ELST, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND 
CULTURAL POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005); see also SERGE L. 
LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE LEGE LATA AC 
FERENDA (Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).  Elst and Levitsky, however, do not connect the history of IP 
regulation in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia with broader debates in Soviet/former Soviet 
international legal theory and practice, which is the goal of the present analysis.   
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legal system.         
B. Lenin as IP Regulator-in-Chief? 
As one of the tenets of Marxism and Leninism was the abolition of 
private property over the means of production and a critique of property 
forms generally,6
One reason for the eruption of fierce debates regarding the nature and 
function of law following the Bolshevik Revolution was that Marx himself did 
not expressly formulate the contours of post-revolutionary law and state.
 it may come as a surprise that the early Soviet state was 
engaged in protecting IP rights.  Yet the early Soviet state was an ardent 
defender of foreign and domestic, individual and commercial, right holders’ 
claims, and not merely under the New Economic Policy which briefly 
liberalized the Soviet economy from 1922 to 1929.  Lenin himself issued no 
less than half dozen decrees on copyright and authors’ rights protections 
between 1917 and 1922.  What explains this seeming paradox?  Did not the 
very notion of owning an idea or a work of art contradict the socialist 
conception of mass production and commonality of title?  The answer to this 
question goes to the very heart of the early Soviet theory of state and law and 
invokes fundamental theoretical debates that rocked the Soviet legal 
establishment throughout the interwar period.  A quick survey of these 
debates is useful to contextualize the discussion that follows.     
7  
Had Marx theorized law as he had intended, it is likely that the Bolsheviks’ 
piety to his teachings would have reduced the ensuing Soviet legal drama to a 
well-managed bureaucratic transition.8
The most influential application of Marxist theory to the problem of 
political reorganization following the proletarian revolution was by Lenin 
  Absent that, it was left to the 
Bolsheviks to negotiate the problems of managing a failed state through a 
series of foreign and domestic challenges while attempting to create consistent 
theoretical justification for their actions.   
 
6 See generally RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY (Oxford, 1945); EVGENY 
PASHUKANIS, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND MARXISM (Barbara Einhorn, transl., Pluto, 1989 ); 
HANS KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW (Praeger, 1955) (especially Chapter 5); HUGH 
W. BABB, SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Harvard, 1951); WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LEGAL 
THEORY (NYU Press, 1996). 
7 Marx touches upon issues of law in his Critique of the Gotha Program and on economic relations as 
a basis for law throughout his work.  See KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (1875, 
Int’l Publ., 1938).  But he does not offer a theory of law, or a programmatic analysis of the role of 
law in a communist society.   
8 В.В. ЛАПАЕВА, ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА В КАПИТАЛЕ МАРКСА 5-6 (Юр. Лит., 1982) [V.V. 
LAPAEVA, QUESTIONS OF LAW IN MARX’S CAPITAL 5-6 (Jur. Lit, 1982)].  Lapaeva’s succinct 
explanation of the doctrinal disagreements between eminent theorists P.I. Stuchka and E.B. 
Pashukanis, on the one hand, and I. Razumovsky, on the other, provides an excellent summary of the 
debates and is a good starting point for scholars interested in understanding the official post-Stalin 
position on Pashukanis.  According to Lapaeva, Razumovsky was able to demonstrate, contra 
Pashukanis, that abstract and concrete conceptions of the legal form did not necessarily require the 
abolition of law, since law did not encompass all relations between property owners, but rather 
represented one aspect of economic relations.  Id. at 7-9. 
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himself in his State and Revolution.9  Here Lenin restated the main theses of 
Marx and Engels on the state, including the theory of class rule, formulated 
the theory of a Marxist state as one ruled by the proletarian class and 
defended this conception against whom he saw as ‘opportunists’ (the German 
Social-Democrats and English Fabians) from the Second International.  Lenin 
outlined the class nature of governments, the origins and role of the state, and 
bourgeois’ use of class antagonism in maintaining the state.10
According to Lenin, following a socialist revolution, the dictatorship of 
the proletariat would develop into a strong, centralized democratic base of 
Soviets (or worker’s councils).  The central communist party would play a 
guiding role in the construction of this socialist state by ensuring discipline, 
organization, and redistributing material resources.  Most importantly, Lenin 
developed and theorized Marx/Engel’s writings on the dual phases of 
communism, the immediate socialist state following a socialist revolution, and 
a higher phase of communism which would finally see the withering away of 
the state.  Contrary to Bukharin,
  Lenin further 
critiqued what he described as a petit-bourgeois illusion of gradual 
transformation of capitalism into socialism without revolution.   
11
Per Lenin, until the ‘highest form of communism’ arose, the party would 
need to exert strict control over society and the state to regulate labor, 
production and consumption.
 Lenin claimed that the transition to 
communism could only come after strengthening the state administrative 
organs and consolidating power in the hands of the Soviets and the party.  
Furthermore, this consolidation of power would coincide with the 
development of other proletarian movements across the world.  Thus, Lenin 
theorized the importance, and indeed, inevitability of the transition period as a 
political and strategic necessity, but also as forceful rhetorical and 
argumentative tool.  As we shall see, this formulation would serve as the basis 
for Korovin’s transition theory of international law and all subsequent Soviet 
theories of international law until the development of the doctrine of 
permanent peaceful coexistence in 1963.  This transition theory would also 
have a direct impact on the development of private law in the early Soviet 
state. 
12
 
9 ЛЕНИН, ГОСУДАРСТВО И РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ: УЧЕНИЕ МАРКСИЗМА О ГОСУДАРСТВЕ И ЗАДАЧИ 
ПРОЛЕТАРИАТА В РЕВОЛЮЦИИ (1917) (Полное собрание соч., 5 изд. т 33 с. 1-120) [LENIN, 
STATE AND REVOLUTION (Robert Service, transl., Penguin 1992)].   
  This higher form of communism would 
10 Lenin theorized that despite differences in form between modern bourgeois states 
(parliamentary, traditional monarchic, etc.), the dictatorship of the capital owning class (the bourgeois 
class) over the proletarian united these diverse forms.   
11 Н. Бухарин, K теории империалистического государства, РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 5 (Изд. Ком. 
Акад., 1925) [N. Bukharin, Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State, in REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 5 
(Communist Academy, 1925)].  To Bukharin, the post-revolutionary state existed only in a transitory 
moment and could not be strengthened after the revolution.  The state apparatus had to be reduced 
in direct correlation with the elimination of classes.  Id. at 13.  This directly contradicted Lenin’s 
position on the need to strengthen the communist apparatus.   
12 STATE AND REVOLUTION, at 97 (Collected Works edition). 
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occur when society would overcome the differences between physical and 
mental labor, divisions of standards of living between urban and rural 
workers, and as a result of the mixing of nations (ethnicities).13  In State and 
Revolution, Lenin does not specify the role of law in the transition from 
bourgeois order to socialism, indeed law is mentioned but once (and even 
then, in a discussion of the Anti-Socialist law in Germany).14  However, in The 
Proletarian Revolution in Russia, a collection of articles and speeches by Lenin 
and Trotsky, it is clear that law as control is meant to be exercised directly by 
the soviets through direct democracy.15
According to Marx, the state and law are elements of a social 
superstructure determined by the economic relations and activities (the base) 
of the ruling classes of a particular society.  If the purpose of the Soviet state 
was to destroy this superstructure and replace it with a domestic communist 
order, then law should have had no function in the new Soviet state.  In other 
words, because law was the manifestation of class struggle and reinforced 
class difference, the abolition of class would require the simultaneous 
abolition of law.  This thesis was famously theorized by the early Soviet legal 
philosopher Evgeny Pashukanis (1891-1937) in his 1924 General Theory of Law 
and Marxism.
  But immediately a theoretical crisis 
presented itself.   
16  Pashukanis went even further than merely exposing the logical 
inconsistency of maintaining law in a classless society.  He argued that since 
law arose as a consequence of property exchange, it was necessary to do away 
with law in effort to disrupt the cycle of property rights, commodity fetishism, 
and material relations between individuals in the new Soviet state.17  In short, 
law went hand in hand with property and vice versa.  Only by abolishing both 
law and property could individuals rise to a higher form of social 
consciousness and political awareness.18
Analogously, on the international plane, it was theoretically impossible 
for the Soviet Union to exist in a world system of law which was built by the 
bourgeois and imperialist ruling class (the powerful imperial nations of the 
nineteenth century).
  
19  These differences between socialism and capitalism 
were deemed a priori to be irreconcilable by some jurists (like Stuchka and 
Pashukanis).20  Others (i.e., Goikhbarg21
 
13 Id. at 93-97.  
) saw the potential of reinventing law 
14 Ibid. 
15 LENIN & TROTSKY, THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 83 (1918). 
16 ЕВГЕНИЙ Б. ПАШУКАНИС, ОБЩАЯ ТЕОРИЯ ПРАВА И МАРКСИЗМ: ОПЫТ КРИТИКИ 
ОСНОВНЫХ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ ПОНЯТИЙ (1924) [EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, GENERAL THEORY OF 
LAW AND MARXISM: AN ATTEMPTED CRITIQUE OF BASIC LEGAL FORMS (Moscow:  Communist 
Academy Publishing, 1924)]. 
17 Id. at 12-37. 
18 Id. at 3, 4. 
19 Id. at 6 (arguing that a subject under international law is identical to a subject under municipal 
law). 
20 Id. at 52 (“Современное международное право включает в себя весьма солидную дозу 
самоуправства (реторсии, репрессалии, войны и т. д.)” – “Contemporary international law 
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to serve the interest of the proletarian class (i.e., the creation of Bolshevik law) 
that would administer the dictatorship of the proletariat.  In international law, 
this meant the creation of a Bolshevik legal order or a socialist international 
law governing relations between Socialist-dominant states and capitalist 
states.22
Though Lenin was a lawyer and himself often spoke and wrote often on 
such central topics as self-determination, sovereignty, non-intervention, and 
international economic law,
   
23 he did not participate in these core theoretical 
debates.  This was due to at least three reasons.  First, as the chief executive of 
the Soviet state, Lenin was too preoccupied with more urgent matters of war 
and peace.  In the first two months of Soviet Russia’s experience, for instance, 
Lenin issued more than 40 decrees concerning foreign relations.24  In the first 
five years (1917-1922), more than 270 legal acts were adopted concerning 
foreign relations.25  Second, it is well-known that Lenin preferred to write in 
populist form to emphasize the relevance of his theories to the working 
masses.26
 
includes a solid dose of contradictory ‘self-regulation’ (retribution, repression, war, etc.).”).  Id. at 67 
n. 148 (“[…] в международных отношениях государство выступает вовсе не как воплощение 
объективной нормы, но как носитель субъективных прав, т. е. со всеми атрибутами 
субстанциональности и эгоистической заинтересованности.” – “[…] in international relations, 
the state does not act as embodying objective norms, but acts as a holder of subjective rights, that is 
with all of the attributes of substantive and egoistic self-interestedness.”). 
  Therefore, it is not surprising that he avoided engaging in the 
21 A.G. Goikhbarg was the first director of the Institute of Soviet Law from 1922 to 1925.  After 
Pashukanis gained control over the Soviet legal academy in 1932, he expelled Goikhbarg from his 
teaching post for maintaining ‘bourgeois’ attachment to the notion of Soviet law.  Goikhbarg was 
ultimately jailed, but rehabilitated after WWII.      
22 ЕВГЕНИЙ А. КОРОВИН, МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО ПЕРЕХОДНОГО ВРЕМЕНИ (М., 1924) 
[EVGENY A. KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (Moscow, 1924)] 
[hereafter, KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD]. 
23 In fact, his writings on international law were ultimately collected and published as a 
standalone volume by the Soviet Institute of International Relations.  ЛЕНИН О МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ 
ПОЛИТИКЕ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ ПРАВЕ (Изд-во Ин-та международных отношений, 1958) 
[LENIN ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL LAW (MGIMO, 1958)]; see also V.I. 
LENIN, QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY (Foreign Languages Publ. House, Moscow, 1959) 
(devoted mainly to self-determination and related questions).  In 1970, the Soviet Union issued a 
volume of Lenin’s contributions to international law, edited by Tunkin and V.F. Fedorov.  See Г.И. 
Тункин, В.Ф. Федоров, ред., В.И. ЛЕНИН И СОВРЕМЕННОЕ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО (Москва, 
Знание 1970) [G.I. Tunkin, V.F. Fedorov, eds., V.I. LENIN AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Moscow, Znanie, 1970)].  For a short overview of Lenin’s contributions to international law, see 
Г.В.Игнатенко, В. И. Ленин и международное право, 2 ПРАВОВЕДЕНИЕ 98-108 (1970), available at 
http://www.law.edu.ru (Russian).  
24 Н.В. МИРОНОВ, ПРАВОВОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНИХ СНОШЕНИЙ СССР (1917-1970) 7 
(ИМО, 1971) [N.V. MIRONOV, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE USSR 
(1917-1970) 7 (IMO, 1971)] (providing an excellent anthology of legal reforms pertaining to foreign 
relations bodies in the Soviet Union from 1917-1970). 
25 Id.  Despite his physical condition, Lenin was actively involved in executive decisions on 
matters of war and the status of the USSR in foreign relations:  Lenin’s responses to on-going peace 
negotiations with the Central Powers, for instance, and exchanges between him, Stalin and Trotsky 
regarding the Georgia Affair and legal status of Transcaucasian SSR showed that he was exceptionally 
sensitive to how the USSR was being perceived abroad.  Ibid. 
26 П.И. Стучка, Ленин и Революционный декрет, РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 32 (Изд. Ком. Акад., 
1925) [P.I. Stuchka, Lenin and the Revolutionary Decree, in REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 32 (1925)] (telling the 
8 Boris N. Mamlyuk [DRAFT  
theoretical fights on the pages of Soviet law journals.  Third, by 1922 (when 
these debates began in earnest) Lenin was effectively debilitated from a stroke, 
itself caused by an assassin’s bullet.  Lenin died in January 1924 just as 
Pashukanis’ and Korovin’s main treatises were being published.    
For these reasons, modern historians and especially legal scholars do not 
treat Lenin’s writings on international law seriously.  However, in the context 
of a Soviet conception of international law and property, Lenin’s writings are 
key to understanding the overarching spirit of pragmatism/realism while 
staying true to core Marxist tenets.27
 First, Lenin explicitly sanctioned the idea of legal instrumentalism, or the 
notion that law needed to serve a particular policy end.  Though law was 
theoretically indeterminate, unnecessary and ultimately a bourgeois fiction,
  Lenin’s influence on Soviet international 
law remained profound in two respects. 
28 it 
was necessary to further the cause of communism in the immediate transition 
period.  This methodology directly influenced an entire generation of pre-
WWII and post-War Soviet jurists.  Indeed, legal instrumentalism (and 
perhaps, exceptionalism) in international law would go on to be the Soviets’ 
most dangerous and most enduring contribution to mainstream international 
law.29
 
anecdote that even Stuchka, despite being intimately familiar with Lenin’s work, did not know that 
Lenin was a lawyer until the two of them were buying a printing press in Spring 1917 and Lenin 
presented his bar card to the seller).   
  Second, how early Soviet jurists rationalized and justified radical 
departures from Marxist doctrine to carry out diametrically opposed policy 
reforms sheds light on the Soviet’s particular sensibility, or mentalité, 
concerning law.  Understanding this intellectual dynamic can explain not just 
how Soviets wanted to have their cake and eat it too; how Soviet law on the 
books differed from “law in action.”  More importantly, by unpacking why and 
how Soviet Russia betrayed its avowed ideals in exchange for tangible benefits 
(recognition, material aid, so on), we can better understand how the very 
notions of law, legality, and so on, were co-opted, decoupled from any 
27 After WWII scholars attempted to systematize Marx’s and Lenin’s writings on international 
law.  Notable among these was Tunkin’s 1970 work.  Г.И. Тункин, В.Ф. Федоров, В.И. Ленин и 
современное международное право, 2 ГОСУДАРСТВО И ПРАВО (1970) [G.I. Tunkin, V.F. Fedorov, V.I. 
Lenin and contemporary international law, 2 STATE AND LAW (1970)]; В.Ф. Губин, Карл Маркс и 
международное право, 2 ГОСУДАРСТВО И ПРАВО (1969) [F.G. Gubin, Karl Marx and international law, 2 
STATE AND LAW (1969)].  These journals are not to be confused with the separate periodical of the 
Institute of State and Law, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo.  
28 Cf ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Yale, 1922).  The 
parallel between Pound’s policy-oriented sociological jurisprudence and early socialist legal theory 
(early Soviet legal realism vs. American legal realism) are underresearched and deserve greater 
scrutiny.  For one move in this direction, see generally MICHAEL HEAD, PASHUKANIS: A CRITICAL 
REAPPRAISAL (2004); Lon L. Fuller, Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: a Study in the Development of Marxian 
Legal Theory, 47 MICH. L. REV. 1157 (1949). 
29 Contemporary scholars trace the theoretical roots of exceptionalism to Carl Schmitt, but 
Evgeny Korovin’s 1924 International Law of the Transition Period arguably influenced Schmitt to a 
greater extent than has been previously understood.               
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objective referent, and ultimately served as nothing but rhetorical gestures.30
1. The Dilemma of Attracting Foreign Trade (Pragmatism & IL)  
  
Two historical moments illustrate how the early Soviet Union came to 
recognize and protect intellectual property rights while being ostensibly 
opposed to law, property, and like ‘bourgeois notions.’  First, this was the 
need to attract foreign trade and project respect for foreign property rights 
pursuant to international obligations.  Second, this need for property 
protection was internalized into the domestic legal order.   
 Modern histories of early Soviet law neglect the economic constraints 
that molded Soviet international legal practice, focusing on major events such 
as Russia’s negotiations of the many peace treaties with WWI adversaries, later 
accession into the League of Nations and subsequent expulsion therefrom.  
Most scholars list historical and political reasons as lying at the root of Soviet 
preference for a classic conception of international law (strict sovereignty, 
anti-monism, etc.).31
But economic realities had a more direct influence on the shaping of 
Soviet notions of international law and the place of the USSR vis-à-vis the 
capitalist states.  As Pashukanis wrote in his brief entry on ‘peaceful 
blockades,’ the Allies, having realized that the Bolsheviks had defeated the 
counter-revolutionaries, lifted their blockade of Soviet Russia on January 16, 
1920 because it was an economic necessity for them to trade with Russia.
  In international relations, the early years of the Bolshevik 
state (1918-1920) are commonly seen as when the Soviets developed a foreign 
policy based on expediency and an ad hoc application of Marxist principles in 
relations with imperialist states to gain recognition, and political legitimacy.   
32  
However, prior to any official recognition of the USSR under international 
law, it was the Soviet Union rather than bourgeois states that was seeking 
foreign trade.  According to Korovin, “[b]y 1921, after the final act of the 
foreign intervention in the Russian civil war, and the final defeat of Wrangel 
in 1919-1920, the Soviet Union shifted to negotiations and began seeking 
compromises and business relationships.”33
In fact, despite the high-flying rhetoric of worker’s councils, global 
  This is not splitting hairs.  As 
both Korovin and Pashukanis claimed that material conditions determined the 
substance of international law, it is important to understand correctly the 
material conditions of the RSFSR and how this affected doctrinal 
developments.   
 
30 Following Prof. Butler, this mentalité, in turn, may bear directly on how contemporary Russian 
jurists approach law.  See Butler, supra note 2, at xiii. 
31 See, e.g., GEORGE GINSBURGS, FROM SOVIET TO RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW:  STUDIES 
IN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (Leiden, Nijhoff, 1998); TARJA LANGSTROM, TRANSFORMATION IN 
RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (M. Nijhoff, 2003); Emanuel Margolis, Certain Aspects of the 
Impact of Communism on International Law, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Harvard University, 
Department of Government), March 1951, at 5-13. 
32 Е. Пашуканис, Мирная Блокада, ЭНЦИКЛОПЕДИЯ ГОСУДАРСТВА И ПРАВА, т. 2, 1002, 1003 
(1925-26) [Pashukanis, Peaceful Blockade, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATE AND LAW, v. 2, 1002, 1003 
(1925-26)].   
33 KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, at 60. 
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revolution, and withering away of law, property, and state, by the early 1920s, 
the territory of the former Russian empire lay in economic ruin.34  From 1919, 
as a consequence of the Great War, the Revolution, the ensuing Civil War, a 
blockade, the armed allied intervention, and Bolshevik agricultural policies, 
the Russian economy was essentially flatlined.35  In addition, as a result of 
drought and crop failure in 1920, by spring 1921 Russia also encountered a 
major famine.36
With the failure of communist revolutions in Europe, by 1922 it became 
clear that the building of socialism communism required industrialization or a 
surrender to the ‘hostile capitalists’ encircling Russia.
   
37  On the domestic 
front, Lenin masterminded the famous (and domestically controversial38) New 
Economic Policy (NEP) program to revive the economy, which was issued by 
decree on March 21, 1921.39
 
34 It is generally agreed that the material situation worsened precipitously from 1917 to 1922.  In 
Socialist and Imperialist Diplomacy, Chicherin’s report to the Fifth Congress in July 1918, he remarks the 
goal of Soviet foreign policy was both staying on the “revolutionary offensive” while coping with the 
“unbelievable deterioration” from the effects of the Great War and Tsarism.  LENIN & TROTSKY, 
THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA 409-410 (1918).  Furthermore, this was a period of 
intense violence and uncertainty in Russia, not only among the general population but also in the 
diplomatic corps.  The assassination of the German ambassador, Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, on 
April 23, 1918 shortly after his arrival in Moscow presented a very real legitimacy challenge for the 
Soviet state.  Id. at 410.  Economic historians, politicians and literary figures also paint a grim tale 
regarding Russia’s economy during this period.  See АЛЕКСЕЙ ТОЛСТОЙ, ХОЖДЕНИЕ ПО МУКАМ 
(РОМАН ТРИЛОГИЯ), КНИГА 3: ХМУРОЕ УТРО (1922-1941) [ALEKSEY TOLSTOY, THE ORDEAL 
(NOVEL TRILOGY), BOOK 3: SULLEN MORNING (1922-1941)] (describing that, in the year after the 
Revolution, it was possible to walk through the center of Moscow at noon-time without 
encountering a single person).  This image is strikingly similar to Josef Koudelka’s famous photo of 
Prague’s Wenceslas Square, nearly empty at noon on August 21, 1968, during the Warsaw Pact 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
  Yet a lesser known aspect of NEP was its focus 
35 Nikolay Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period (1920), in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 
OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD (K.J. Tarbuck, ed., London 1979); Bukharin, Imperialism and World 
Economy (1918); Charles Noble Gregory, The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations, 15 
AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 49 (1921) (“The Soviet press shows that excluding railroad employees workers in 
industry decreased 2,402,000 men up to January 1919 and a report of the Supreme Council of 
Popular Economy of March 1919 states that production in the greater number of Russian industries 
has decreased 400 to 500 per cent.”) 
36 LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, ON THE TRAIL OF THE RUSSIAN FAMINE (Stanford, 1927); see also 
Terence Emmons, Bertrand M. Patenaude, eds., WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA: THE 
PASSAGES OF FRANK GOLDER, 1914-1927 at 89 (Hoover Press, 1992) (describing drought in 1920-
1921 and the major famine in Russia stretching from the Volga valley and into southern Ukraine).   
37 ALEC NOVE, WAS STALIN REALLY NECESSARY? at 21.   
38 The NEP enveloped and called into question the core premises of the Bolshevik revolution, 
including the protection of private property, land reform, and accommodation of the bourgeois 
merchant class. 
39 Some Russian sources place this event on March 23, 1921.  The decree “On the Replacement 
of Prodrazvyorstka [Foodstuffs Requisition] by Prodnalog [Foodstuffs Tax]” was issued on March 21, 
1921.  See Декрет ВЦИК, принятий на основе решения Х съезда РКП(б) “О замене разверстки 
натуральным налогом” (21 марта 1921 г.), available at 
http://www.hrono.info/dokum/prod_nal.html (last accessed June 2, 2008); see also Речь Владимира 
Ильича Ленина «О продовольственном налоге или о продналоге и о свободном обмене 
хлебных излишков»  [Speech of V.I. Lenin “On Foodstuff Tax and/or Free Exchange of Excess 
Wheat Production”], audio file of the speech, available at,  
2010] RUSSIAN LEGAL HARMONIZATION:  IP 11 
on reviving international trade, particularly with respect to exports of grain 
and raw materials.  Just as international trade presented a strategic dilemma—
restarting international trade meant cooperating with the same ‘hostile 
capitalists’ the Bolsheviks had so fiercely opposed—the contradictions 
between NEP and Marxist theory could not have been wider.   
As a further strain on the tensions between Marxism and the actual 
Soviet policies, in 1921 the Soviet Union began praying for material 
sustenance from the ‘capitalist’ West to relieve the effects of the famine.40  
Then, as now, the United States was one of the first states to respond.  By 
Summer 1921, the American Relief Administration (ARA), headed by Herbert 
Hoover,41 began delivering medical supplies and foodstuffs, along with private 
aid from worker’s unions and individuals.  On August 20, 1921, in response to 
Gorky’s call for aid, the ARA and the Soviet government signed the Riga 
Agreement stipulating that the ARA had the right to control its operations 
inside Russia provided it did not mix with Soviet politics.42  Similar 
agreements were signed with the German Red Cross organizations and other 
states’ relief organizations.43
On the one hand, the ARA aid humiliated the Bolsheviks, who resented 
not only the notion of imperialists ‘bailing out’ socialists but were also uneasy 
about a foreign organization with a sizeable local staff operating throughout 
much of the country.
  But it was U.S. aid that attracted particular 
interest and ire from the Soviets.   
44
 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/Lenin_-_About_Natural_Tax.ogg (last 
accessed September 27, 2009). 
  The suspicion was shared, though it was ultimately 
40 In July 1921, writer Maxim Gorky (at the behest of Lenin) issued an appeal to “all honest 
citizens” to send food and medical supplies to Soviet Russia. 
41 WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, supra. Golder, an archivist and Director of the 
Hoover Library at Stanford University travelled extensively throughout revolutionary Russia.  He also 
served on the American Relief Administration, formerly a government aid agency, but at the time a 
private relief organization headed by then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.   
42 Id. at 90 (citing HAROLD H. FISHER, THE FAMINE IN SOVIET RUSSIA, 1919-1923: THE 
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION (New York, 1927).)  Archival records 
reveal the vast scope of the ARA operation:   
The initial plan was for the ARA to feed two to three million 
children, but the mission rapidly expanded to include adults and 
medical relief as well.  The major leap forward came on December 
22, 1921, when President Warren Harding signed into law a 
congressional appropriation of $20 million for the purchase of corn 
and seed grain from U.S. farmers for Russian relief.  To this total 
other government and private U.S. contributions were added (as 
well as a Soviet government expenditure of nearly $12 million from 
its gold reserve); in the end the two-year ARA program amounted to 
more than $60 million. 
43 TIMOTHY A. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 
(Macmillan, 1935) [hereafter Taracouzio].   
44 WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE IN RUSSIA, at 90; see also KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD 63 (1926) (recalling negotiations with “representatives of the 
International Red Cross, and with personal friends of the American president, vacationing 
billionaires, and commercial groupds.”).  This resentment echoes Russia’s post-2000 turn against the 
foreign aid establishment.   
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resolved to mutual benefit.45  As a matter of international law, Korovin was 
also alarmed by relief organizations’ claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
wrote at length about the need to limit the legal status of foreign charitable 
organizations operating in the Soviet Union.  Writing in the first volume of 
the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, for instance, Korovin stressed the importance of 
limiting the rights of foreign organizations operating on Soviet soil, but also 
recognizing the need to set reasonable permissions to aid famine relief 
efforts.46
 On the other hand, NEP and foreign aid programs in the early 1920s 
certainly worked, as evidenced by the increase in international trade and 
betterment of material conditions in Russia during that period.  Between the 
years 1921 and 1925, trade with the U.S., for instance, quadrupled.
    
47  During 
this time, the USSR also entered into a large number of bilateral treaties with 
European states to normalize trade relations.48  Each of these agreements 
stipulated that the USSR would honor foreign investor’s property rights on its 
territory, in sharp break from the nationalization decrees issued in the 
immediate aftermath of the Revolution.49  To facilitate this process, between 
1922 and 1924, the Soviet diplomatic apparatus was restructured to avoid 
conflicts between the consular representatives abroad and the foreign trade 
representatives working under the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade 
(NarKomVneshTorg).50
 
45 Id. at 90 (“The ARA mission was headed by a career army officer, Colonel William N. Haskell, 
most of whose U.S. staff had served in the American Expeditionary Force.  Many men had attended 
some of the finest U.S. colleges and universities and had had experience with the ARA in Europe.  
They were eager to tackle the Russian job with trademark ARA drive and efficiency and had little 
tolerance for Soviet inefficiency and suspicion; they especially resented the network of Red Army commissars 
and agents of the secret police set up to monitor their activities.  There were many ARA-Soviet confrontations 
over issues big and small, but each was somehow resolved through diplomacy.  In the end the Soviet 
government officially acknowledged the ARA’s contribution in checking the famine and saving 
millions of lives.”) (emphasis added). 
   Ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet 
46 Е.А. Коровин, Иностраная филантропическая деятельность в РСФСР и ее правовые формы, 1(1) 
СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 108 (1922) [E.A. Korovin, Foreign Philanthropic Activity in the RSFSR and its Legal 
Forms, 1(1) SOVIET LAW 108 (1922)].  In his International Law of the Transition Period, he was more 
direct:  “A charitable organization—[such as the Red Cross]—claiming universality over territorial 
sovereignty of nations is the same legal nonsense as the attempt of a corporation to claim rights 
under family law.”  KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, at 35. 
47 The U.S. and Soviet Russia signed a “Memorandum on Trade” in January 1921.  See 
Memorandum on Trade With Soviet Russia: Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the United States Senate, January, 1921.  These estimates are tentative because significant portions of 
the increased trade were relief shipments by the U.S.  See U.S. BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 
COMMERCE, COMMERCE REPORTS, VOL. 4, at 561 (Oct. to Dec., 1922).  In March 1921, the RSFSR 
also extended the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, though disputes with Great 
Britain over the Wrangell Islands and the intervention led to a slight decrease in trade in 1923.   
48 Taracouzio, supra note X, at 143-50. 
49 Ibid. 
50 KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, at 69 (discussing the 
purpose of the Soviet consulates as being limited to: “(a) protection of economic and legal interests of 
the RSFSR; (b) official representation of RSFSR and other Soviet organs in the given states; (c) the 
protection of interests—economic, legal and social—of citizens of the RSFSR and its legal entities and 
firms.”) (emphasis added).   
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agricultural and industrial production returned to pre-war (pre-1913) levels.51  
By 1930, Soviet administrators and scholars openly prided themselves on the 
exponential increase in trade with European powers and with the U.S. during 
the 1920s.52
The benefits of these bilateral trade treaties, of course, flowed both ways.  
From the Soviet side, the treaties were conditioned on explicit recognition of 
the Soviet state under international law.
   
53  Therefore, the USSR acquired 
significant leverage and legitimacy from initiating trade relations.  In turn, the 
bilateral treaties of commerce provided Western European powers and U.S. 
firms with access to Russian goods and concessions.  In essence, the bilateral 
trade agreements provided most-favored nation guarantees, either in absolute 
form, or under the “form of a conditional (compensational) favoredness, 
occasionally giving way to preferential regulations more or less extensive in 
scope.”54
 Concessions.  Prior to 1928, the Soviet Union recognized three forms of 
foreign involvement in the Soviet economy:  (1) direct concessions; (2) foreign 
investment in Soviet firms established pursuant to Soviet law; (3) operation of 
foreign firms on Soviet soil.
  Two concrete examples—the issue of concessions and foreign 
debt—show the extent to which Soviet leaders bowed to foreign pressure 
during this time.  This in turn, helps to contextualize the IP reforms in the 
crucial early years of the Soviet state.  
55
 
51 Boris Skvirsky, Russia’s Internal Situation and Foreign Policy—Russian-American Trade Relations, 138 
Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science 97, 99 (1928).  Skvirsky’s official title 
before the restoration of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was that of Director of 
the Soviet Union Information Bureau, Washington D.C. 
  With the start of the first five-year plan (1928-
1933), the Soviet Union did not award a single additional concession, and 
sought to restrict existing concessions on the basis of special agreements by 
52 Т. Шкловский, Вопросы организации внешней и внутриней торговли, 7 СОВЕТСКОЕ ГОС. И 
РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 74 (1930) [T. Shklovsky, Questions of Organization of Internal and Foreign Trade, 7 
Sov. Gos. i Revolutsia Prava 74 (1930)].  Shklovsky’s article contains useful data on Soviet private, 
coop and public foreign trade during the period 1923 to 1929.   
53 See Taracouzio, at 258-260.  Taracouzio, however, incorrectly dates the first of the economic 
agreements between the USSR and Western Powers as being the March 16, 1921 agreement between 
the USSR and Great Britain.  In actuality, the US-Soviet Memorandum on Trade dated January 1921 
was the first, though Taracouzio is correct that the Soviet-British agreement served as the model for 
the subsequent treaties with European powers.  These treaties included, inter alia, Provisional 
Agreement with Germany of May 6, 1921; Provisional Agreement with Norway of September 2, 
1921; Treaty of December 7, 1921 with Austria; Provisional Agreement with Italy of December 26, 
1921; Provisional Agreement with Sweden of March 1, 1922; Provisional Treaty with Czechoslovakia 
of June 5, 1922; Agreement with Denmark of April 23, 1923.   
54 E.A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 753, 754 (1928).  By 
‘compensational favoredness,’ Korovin meant the right of the Soviet state to apply preferential 
regulations to commerce with bordering states, or those that formed, prior to 1917, a part of the 
Russian Empire.  Id. at 756.  This theme of regional trade preferences for the near-abroad is strikingly 
similar to recent regional integration efforts by the Russian Federation.   
55 М. Плоткин, Права иностранцев на современном этапе, 3 СОВЕТСКОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО 75 
(1934) [M. Plotkin, The Rights of Foreigners at the Current Stage, 3 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO 75 
(1934)]. 
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purchasing remainder rights from the holders.56  The remaining concessions 
were insignificant.  According to Soviet sources, private industry at the end of 
the first five-year plan represented only .07% of the Soviet industrial output.57  
Similarly, joint stock companies founded in the USSR with foreign capital 
during the NEP period were progressively liquidated.  During the first five 
year period, no additional joint stock companies with foreign capital were 
formed.58  The decrees of the Central Executive Committee dated March 11, 
1931 also slightly liberalized the rules pertaining to foreign firms and their 
representatives operating in the Soviet Union.  Pursuant to Article 12 of this 
decree, firms engaged in negotiations with Soviet trade representatives in 
Russia no longer had to register and apply for licenses prior to entering 
negotiations.59
The Soviet international law establishment was fully engaged in support 
of foreign trade.  This is evident not only in the spirit of doctrinal writings, 
Korovin’s dispatches to the American Journal of International Law, and so on, but 
also in calls for substantive reforms to existing treaties and trade agreements.  
For instance, by 1930-31, the Soviet legal academy was mobilized in 
opposition to a new round of trade tariffs from the U.S.  Within months of 
the announcement of Article 307 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 (prohibiting 
the importation of goods made with forced labor), Soviet international 
lawyers produced a series of articles critiquing the trade law on general 
political as well as substantive grounds.
   
60  The expectation of continued 
growth in foreign trade during the second five-year plan also required changes 
in the constitutions of the individual Soviet republics.  Extensive protections 
were afforded to foreign enterprises and their employees operating on Soviet 
soil.  For instance, pursuant to an instruction of the Central Executive 
Committee dated October 3, 1930, foreign workers were granted all formal 
political rights, including the right to vote.61
Foreign Debt.  Another external constraint shaping Soviet attitudes on 
foreign relations and domestic legal reform was the large foreign debt owed to 
the U.S., France and England which the Soviet Union inherited from the 
    
 
56 Id. at 76. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 77 (discussing liquidation proceedings against the companies Ratao and Sovpoltorg). 
59 Id. at 77. 
60 Экономичиская борьба капиталистических стран против СССР, 3 СОВЕТСКОЕ ГОС. И 
РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ ПРАВА 113, 117 (1931) [Economic Battle of Capitalist States Versus the Soviet Union, 3 SOV. 
GOS. I REVOLUTSIA PRAVA 113, 117 (1931)] (proposing the existence of covert economic war 
against the Soviet Union).  Raevich also published an article disputing the American allegations that 
Soviet goods were produced with forced labor.  Id. at 127.  
61 Plotkin, supra note X, at 78.  The favorable treatment of foreign workers (including 
government subsidies) was meant to demonstrate the equitable work conditions of the Soviet state.  
Indeed, according to one Soviet scholar, the only distinction between foreign workers and Soviet 
citizens was simply the conception of ‘foreignness’—the existence of which was, again, necessitated 
by capitalist encirclement. Id. 
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Tsarist and Kerensky governments.62  The original position of the RSFSR was 
to revoke all debt obligations to Europe and the U.S. on the basis that these 
debts were not incurred by the toiling masses, or on their behalf.63  However, 
debt negotiations formed a major part of early Soviet diplomatic efforts with 
the West, as evidenced by Chicherin’s reports of October 28, 1921 and 
January 1922.64  These notes show that Soviet leaders could not sustain their 
opposition to the debt, as the issue became a major bargaining point of the 
Western powers towards the USSR.  In response, the Soviet delegations 
slowly gave way on these issues.  First, they acknowledged several important 
distinctions between classes of debt.  Pre-1914 debt was acknowledged as 
possibly valid because it was issued for the purpose of developing Russia’s 
economy, whereas post-1914 debt was issued to sustain the imperial war 
effort.65  Moreover, the Soviet Union countered with a number of offsets, 
consisting of two classes of claims: (1) for the value of Russian assets situated 
abroad; and (2) for the value of damage caused by the Allied Intervention.66  
By 1925, the Soviet government agreed to pay outstanding debts to European 
states by modifying a number of terms, including reduction of the amounts of 
the debt.67
Diplomatic notes show the debt to have been a major point of 
contention between the U.S. and the Soviet Union well into the mid-1930s.  
In addition to setting debt repayment as a precondition for recognition of the 
USSR, the U.S. set the following requirements:  (1) USSR had to reject its call 
for a world revolution and cease propaganda activities; (2) reverse its decree 
regarding the annulment of international debt obligations (not just U.S.);
  The outstanding debt owed to the U.S., however, remained 
unsettled.   
68 and 
(3) agree to recognize its international obligations [generally].69  The last 
point—the agreement to recognize general principles of international law—
related directly to respect for foreign property rights on the Soviet territory, an 
issue of central importance to the present discussion.  The initial Soviet 
response was flippant: the Soviet Union did not need any legal or de facto 
recognition from the West.70
 
62 KASIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOCTRINES AND 
DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 95-97 (Leiden: Sitjhoff, 1970).   
  However, this posture was disingenuous as the 
Soviet Union certainly sought recognition from the U.S. and the Soviets were 
63 The unilateral revocation of all outstanding debts was announced by Lenin in a decree on 
January 21/February 3, 1918.  International Law Reports, 162.   
64 GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note X, at 95-96.  
65 Id. at 96. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 The debt was partly due to the enormous increase in Russian-American trade (primarily 
exports from the U.S. to Russia during WWI.  See GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECISION TO 
INTERVENE 323 (Princeton, 1958) (discussing the influence of private American interests on 
decision to intervene, including American-Russian Chamber of Commerce composed of bankers 
(A.B. Hepburn), industrialists and “thirty to forty other firms.”). 
69 Id. at 20. 
70 Ibid. 
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expending great diplomatic efforts to win U.S. recognition.71
In international law, Korovin justified the Soviet debt annulment by 
reference to his class/transition theory—essentially arguing that the Soviet 
social revolution created a radically new legal form that was qualitatively 
different from other states.
  
72
First, it is important to understand that the Soviet state initially 
continued to service (pay interest on) the debt, even following the decree on 
annulment.
  Korovin admitted that ordinarily any successor 
state was bound by the legal and financial obligations of its predecessor, but 
refused to acknowledge the Soviet debt on the basis of communist principles.  
Diplomatic history and the facts of the actual debt service by the Soviet state 
reveal a slightly different story.    
73  This supports the theory that the Soviet Union sought to 
project adherence to international norms and bilateral agreements even when 
they ran counter to the professed ideology.74  For the following fifteen years, 
while the Soviet Union publicly espoused Korovin’s position—arguing that 
the debt was not legally binding on the USSR as it was carried out contrary to 
the wishes of the proletarian class—Soviet diplomats privately emphasized 
that the debt would be settled and that the USSR would fully comply with all 
international obligations.75
On November 16, 1933, the Soviet state publicly agreed to repay the 
debt in exchange for recognition by the U.S. and joining the League of 
Nations.  To save face and maintain theoretical consistency, the debt 
settlement agreement between President Roosevelt and the USSR People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov did not expressly stipulate that the 
USSR would repay debt incurred by the Kerensky government.  Rather, the 
agreement employed a creative legal device (which came to be known as the 
Litvinov Assignment), whereby the USSR would pay $9 million in pre-
     
 
71 This position is surprising because the Soviet Union had worked exceedingly hard at gaining 
recognition of European powers.  The stance vis-à-vis the U.S. may have been a negotiating tactic, 
but it certainly did not resemble the prior negotiation efforts.   
72 KOROVIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD, at 30.   
73 Interestingly, in 1987 a class action case was brought by a firm against the Soviet Union in a 
U.S. district court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) to recover part of the debt 
($75 million, representing a $25 million issue in 1916 and a $50 million issue by the Tsarist 
government in 1917).  See Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 665 F.Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d per 
curiam, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir., 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).  The court denied the claim, 
holding that the FSIA would not apply retroactively to the Imperial-era bond issue.  After reviewing 
case law, the court also held that as late as 1926, the USSR (like any foreign sovereign) would have 
had expectation of absolute immunity from suit in the U.S.  The USSR had a justified expectation 
that it would not be retroactively sued in the U.S.  The case is noteworthy for its succinct retelling of 
the relevant facts of the debt issue.   
74 Interest was paid on the remaining three installments of the bond certificates on July 19, 1918, 
January 10, 1919 and July 10, 1920.  Interest was also paid on the bearer bond coupons due on June 
1, 1918, December 1, 1918 and June 1, 1918.  Id. at 326. 
75 U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to Political Relations Between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, The National Archives of the United States 1934 [Cornell Library Microfilm, Film 5863, Roll 
1] (containing diplomatic dispatches from Joseph Davies, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union) 
[hereafter Davies].  
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inflation money to the United States in exchange for an assignment of all 
claims, including those due it as the successor of prior Governments of 
Russia, “on condition that it be notified of any recovery by the United States 
on such claims.”76
Why did the USSR agree to repay the obligation when most historians 
agree that it could have chosen to not recognize the debt?
    
77
 Unclassified diplomatic dispatches between then Ambassador to the 
USSR Joseph Davies and the State Department shed light upon the matter.
   
78
of relative unimportance of the matter to the United States and the 
supreme importance to the Russian people of having in the future a body 
of liberal public opinion in the United States sympathetic to the Russian 
people, particularly in view of the uncertain international situation [the 
threat of war].
  
On the topic of debt owed to the U.S., Davies stressed the symbolic 
significance to the Russians of repayment.  The amount of the loan itself was, 
in the words of Davies,   
79
Indeed, since by the early 1930s the Soviet Union began to seriously 
contemplate the threat from fascist regimes, paying off the minor debt in 
effort to curry favor with the significantly more powerful U.S. government 
seems to have been a reasonable step to balance the deteriorating relationship 
with Germany.  This was all the more true because by 1933, Stalin’s position 
was sufficiently entrenched that he would not really lose political capital 
domestically for settling the debt issue.  In any event, it is clear from the 
negotiations that “it was a serious matter to [Russia] to retain the confidence 
of the [U.S.] government in the performance of the [debt settlement] 
agreement[.]
   
80  One can surmise several other likely motivations.  First, Soviet 
leaders began to realize the immense economic potential of trading with the 
U.S. and other developed countries in order to further accelerate 
industrialization.  Second, with Soviet acquisition of Ford automobile and 
tractor manufacturing plants, steel refineries and general technical know-how, 
measurable progress in the manufacturing sector meant moving away from 
the status of a raw material exporter, thereby improving global standing, and 
giving greater support to the possibility of ‘socialism in one country.’81
 
76 Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 665 F.Supp. 323, 327.  For a discussion of similar claims against 
the Soviets, see Alexander Nahum Sack, Diplomatic Claims Against the Soviets (1918-1938), N.Y.U. 
School of Law Contemporary Law Pamphlets, Ser. 1, No. 7 (1938). 
   
77 The amount of the indebtedness was approximately $200 million in 1933 dollar (when it was 
settled for $9 million).  The original amount was approximately $75 million from two issues.  It was 
held in bearer bonds and credit participation certificates.   
78 U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to Political Relations Between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, The National Archives of the United States 1934 [Cornell Library Microfilm, Film 5863, Roll 
1]. 
79 Davies, at 15.   
80 Davies, at 63-64. 
81 Of the over 2,500 treaties that Soviet Russia concluded during the first forty year period of its 
existence (1917-1957), the majority concerned economic problems and questions, chiefly matters of 
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 The subjective element in the debt negotiations should also be noted.  As 
Davies remarked, the Soviet diplomats went out of their way to impress upon 
him (with personal guarantees and gestures) that the Soviet Union would pay 
the debt.  Likewise, Davies in his official and personal capacities made a great 
deal of the humanitarian similarities between the U.S. and Soviet Union.  In 
his words:    
[U.S.] did have a great body of humanitarian democratic thought which 
did have great influence upon world opinion among liberal minded men 
everywhere which might be of inestimable value to Russia at some point in 
the future; and that speaking as a friend of the humanitarian impulses and purposes 
of the Russian people, personally I felt compelled to say that in my opinion it 
would be a great pity if a cloud were to be permitted by the Soviet 
government to dim the confidence which my government might have in 
the integrity and character of the men who were running affairs here; that 
this was particularly true in my opinion because there was no leadership of any 
of the great nations of the earth that viewed with as much sympathy the fundamental 
humanitarian purposes of the Russian people to the degree that President Roosevelt and 
Secretary of State Hull did; that it would be too bad if a condition were to be 
permitted by the Soviet government to exist which would dampen or 
destroy their confidence in the integrity of leadership; that financial credits 
and business considerations in importance faded into nothing in contrast with this 
matter of the principle involved.is producing enormous agricultural and mineral 
wealth annually, and it will not be dependent upon import or export for 
many years to come.  […]  While there is no question but what, in its 
present phase, its efficiency cannot compare with capitalist states and 
possibly never will, nevertheless, in the absence of competition or necessity for 
competition with capitalist states, such inefficiencies need not and will not appear.82
From the Soviet side, Marshal of the USSR and staunch Stalin-ally, Kliment 
Voroshilov
   
83 agreed that the financial amount involved “was relatively small” 
and urged to settle the matter on “big broad, general principles and that a way 
should be found, that he appreciated the greatness of the President of the 
United States.”84  Aside from subjective factors,85
 
trade and commerce.  See JAN F. TRISKA, ROBERT M. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF 
SOVIET TREATIES 5 (1962) (providing an excellent overview of Soviet treaty practice during early 
Soviet period). 
 Voroshilov and Litvinov’s 
82 Davies, at 64 (Moscow, February 18, 1937 – Dispatch No. 68 [Ambassador Davies to 
Secretary of State Hull]) (emphasis added). 
83 Voroshilov was appointed People’s Commissar for Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman of 
the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, a post he held until 1934, when he was elevated to 
Marshal of the Soviet Union.   
84 Davies, at 64 (Moscow, February 18, 1937 – Dispatch No. 68 [Ambassador Davies to 
Secretary of State Hull]). 
85 There are many such factors in the diplomatic notes, and they call for a critical reexamination, 
both generally, as well as part of a ‘rehabilitation,’ so-to-speak, of Davies who was branded ‘too soft’ 
on the communists by critics.  For instance, it is noteworthy to observe the near-obsequiousness of 
the Soviet leaders in their interactions with Davies.  In one example, President Kalinin warned 
Ambassador Davies of superficial snap judgments of Russia—“A visitor might see some 
drunkenness on the streets of Moscow and therefore draw the conclusion that all Russians are 
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desire to see the debt matter settled on ‘broad principles’ was highly 
consistent with the body of Soviet treaty practice that had developed by that 
time.  This can be summarized as follows:  
(1) Protection of foreign property rights in the USSR via bilateral trade 
agreements; 
(2) Diplomatic assurances that the USSR treated investment and property 
claims as apolitical ‘administrative’ issues governed by private international 
law;  
(3) Increasing emphasis that competition with ‘bourgeois’ states was a 
matter of ideological difference, rather than an actual political posture;86
Of the three, the most important vehicle for the promotion of foreign trade 
was projecting a predictable treaty regime.  But demonstrating the strength of 
domestic property rights regimes and enforcement mechanisms was a close 
corollary.   
   
 Korovin wrote extensively on this subject in his treatises and journal 
articles.87   In his International Law of the Transition Period, for instance, he 
emphasized that treaties were the sole source of international law and were 
sacrosanct in Soviet practice (though not in theory88).  In his 1927 article on 
treaties, he explained that treaties formed a backbone of Soviet foreign 
practice and were inviolable, save to further advance the cause of 
communism.89
2. The Dilemma of Reconciling Communism, NEP & IP  
  The Soviet diplomatic corps was instructed to emphasize that 
the Soviet Union, aside from rejecting secret diplomacy, had never violated a 
single treaty.  Aside from projecting a predictable treaty regime and respect for 
international norms to attract investment, the Soviet Union also incorporated 
international customary and conventional law on the protection of property in 
its domestic legislation.  This understudied issue is central to our discussion of 
vertical harmonization.    
The attraction and protection of foreign trade in the Soviet Union 
necessarily required the adoption of domestic laws to protect property, since 
without security, Western firms simply would not invest in Russia.90
 
drunkards, which, of course, was not the fact.”  Davies, at 28 (Moscow, January 25, 1937 – Dispatch 
No. 11 [Ambassador Davies to Secretary of State Hull]). 
  Korovin 
86 See Davies, at 103-105 (Moscow, March 12, 1937 – Dispatch No. 116 [Ambassador Davies to 
Secretary of State Hull, titled “Russian Industry – How It Works and Why”] (emphasis added). 
87 See, e.g., Е.А. Коровин, К пересмотру "Женевской Конвенции," 15(3) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 52 
(1925) [E.A. Korovin, Reexamination of the Geneva Convention, 15(3) SOVIET LAW 52 (1925)].  
88 Е.А. Коровин, Оговорка rebus sic stantibus  в международной практике Р.С.Ф.С.Р., 6(3) 
СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 53 (1922) [E.A. Korovin, The Principle Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Practice of 
the RSFSR, 6(3) SOVIET LAW 53 (1922)] (upholding the classic conception of rebus sic stantibus 
principle and doctrine of necessity for violating positive treaty obligations). 
89 Е.А. Коровин, Советские договоры и международное право 30(6) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 91 (1927) 
[E.A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 30(6) SOVIET LAW 91 (1927)]. 
90 See, e.g., Н.В. МИРОНОВ, ПРАВОВОЕ РЕГУЛИРОВАНИЕ ВНЕШНИХ СНОШЕНИЙ СССР 
(1917-1970) 275 n. 29 (ИМО, 1971) [N.V. MIRONOV, LEGAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE USSR (1917-1970) at 275 n. 29 (IMO, 1971)] (discussing a decree issued by the 
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and subsequent Soviet authors treated the protection of property under 
international law as questions of international administrative law, as apolitical 
issues on which cooperation with the West was not only permissible, but 
encouraged.91  Notwithstanding the centrality of property rights to domestic 
legal battles and theoretical debates, international protection of property 
rights, as in the case of intellectual property, was seen by Soviet theorists as a 
foreign policy issue, and hence subordinate to more pressing foreign trade-
related policy discussions.  For instance, despite not adhering to the Berne 
Convention of 188692 or the revision to the treaty signed at Berlin in 1908,93 
the early Soviet state took tremendous pains to signify its protection of 
foreigner’s copyright, patents and trademarks.  This was done principally by 
harmonizing Soviet domestic legislation with international customary and 
conventional law—tantamount to participating in the given treaty bodies, 
without actually doing so.94
Authors’ Rights.  Between 1917 and 1931, there were almost yearly radical 
changes to the IP regulatory framework and the administrative organs charged 
with implementing the laws.
  We can trace this process by observing the 
evolution of Soviet domestic legislation on authors’ rights.   
95  The earliest Soviet law concerning authors’ 
rights and patent rights was a decree in 1917 nationalizing all such rights “in 
the interest of government,”96
 
NKID on May 23, 1919 ‘On the Prohibition of Protection of Property of Foreigners from States 
Which Have Severed Diplomatic Relations with RSFSR’); И. БЕРНШТЕЙН, Б. ЛАНДАУ, В. 
МАШКЕВИЧ, ПРАВОВЫЕ УСЛОВИЯ КОНЦЕССИОННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ В СССР 26-47 (М: 1930) 
[I. BERNSTEIN, B. LANDAU, V. MASHKEVICH, LEGAL CONDITIONS OF CONCESSIONS IN THE 
USSR 26-47 (M: 1930)]. 
 with limited protection for the authors.  
Pursuant to this decree, the duration of authors’ rights was limited to six 
91 See KOROVIN, CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. VIII (especially pages 98-
102).  It is curious that Western legal historians have not focused more on this aspect of Soviet law 
and the contradictions between Marxist conceptions of private property, Lenin’s formulation of state 
capitalism, and Stalin’s foreign trade relations policy.  It seems the contradiction concerning property 
and Soviet trade and concessions with Western firms was much more fertile soil for pointing out 
contradictions in Soviet theory and practice than revisiting the abstract debates concerning the nature 
of law.   
92See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971 
(amended Sept. 28, 1979).  The Berne Convention removed registration requirements to trigger 
copyright protection, and codified continental conceptions of moral rights.  The U.S. opposed the 
Berne Convention because of the removal of registration requirements.  By contrast, as indicated 
above, the USSR removed domestic registration requirements, without formally acceding to the 
Berne Convention.   
93 See Taracouzio, at 154 n. 93.   
94 This strategy is remarkably similar to the IP reform efforts of the Russian Federation to 
comply with TRIPs throughout the 2000s without being a signatory or member of the WTO, an 
issue that will be discussed infra.   
95 Галина Витальевна Довгань, Система государственных органов и общественных организаций в 
сфере изобретательства в УССР (1924-1931 гг.) [Galina V. Dovgan’, System of State Organs and Social 
Organizations in the Sphere of Patent Protection in the Ukrainian SSR (1924-1931)], available at 
http://www.lomonosov-msu.ru/archive/Lomonosov_2008/28_4.pdf 
96 John N. Hazard, Notes on Economic Law (Prof. Amfitiatrov, 1936) at 90 (Manuscript Collection, 
Columbia University Libraries, Bakhmeteff Archive). 
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months, after which all rights reverted to the state.97
Ivan Peretersky, writing in the journal Sovetskoe Pravo, analyzed these 
domestic legislative changes in the field of author’s rights following the 
Bolshevik revolution.
   
98  What is immediately striking regarding these reforms 
was that they occurred so soon after the revolution.  The first proposed 
decree on author’s rights was issued on December 6, 1917, just one month 
after the Bolsheviks gained control.99  Pursuant to this proposal, the length of 
the protected term was reduced to fifteen years, followed by a five year period 
where the copyright100 was held by the state if the People’s Commissariat of 
Enlightenment found them to have aesthetic or scientific value.101  The 
proposal was not adopted.  Instead, an even more restrictive regime was adopted 
by decree on December 29, 1917, monopolizing authors’ rights in favor of the 
state for a period of five years.102  Furthermore, on June 11, 1918, a decree 
was issued on the abolition of the inheritance of author’s rights, except in the 
case of heirs below the age of majority or where they were not capable of 
working (нетрудоспособные).103  Shortly thereafter, on November 26, 1918, 
another decree was issued “nationalizing scientific, literary and artistic 
works,”104
Pursuant to this decree, any work (published or unpublished) could be 
claimed by the state as its property.
 remaining in force until 1923.   
105  The relevant state agency then had the 
right to publication, reproduction and public exhibition of the work.106  The 
author was entitled to an honorarium and, in the case of minor children, 
remainder rights could be paid out to the heirs from the proceeds of the 
work.107  The author’s right expired six months after death.108  Interestingly, in 
regulations promulgated by the People’s Commissariat on Enlightenment on 
February 9, 1919, the old 50-year terms were used for works created prior to 
the nationalization, or specifically, June 1, 1919.109
These conflicting decrees were systematically reworked following the 
introduction of NEP, not only to protect domestic authors, but also to 
   
 
97 Id.  
98 И. Перетерский, Задачи Советского законодательства в области авторстого права, 4(1) 
СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 92 (1923) [I. Peretersky, Goals of Soviet Legislation in the Field of Author’s Rights, 
4(1) SOVIET LAW 92 (1923)].   
99 Id. at 92. 
100 I shall use the term copyright and author’s rights interchangeably.  The term author’s rights is 
the preferred term in the Soviet literature (as well as in Continental jurisprudence more generally), but 
the concepts and legal ramifications are identical.    
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. (citing Article 1). 
106 Id. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 93.  In addition, by decree dated August 16, 1921, all textbooks were to be published by 
the state publishing house ГосИздат (Gosizdat). Ibid. 
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incorporate international protections for the defense of foreign authors.  
Peretersky indicates that more than one year went into the drafting of the new 
law on author’s rights.110  This new law was intended to be a departure from 
the Russian Imperial code of 1911, both in substance and spirit, but 
Peretersky’s account points to tension within the ISL in the drafting of the 
new code.111  First, much like American opposition to the Berne Convention 
on the basis of moral rights, drafters had difficulty conceptualizing precisely 
what was being protected—whether it was the abstract “spiritualized” right of 
the author to his or her creation or the work product of this spiritual, 
“psychological” process.112  Moreover, there were proposals to discard this 
distinction, as well as the distinction between authors’ rights and patents over 
physical inventions, in favor of a broad principle protecting quite simply, 
products of labor, consistent with Marxist ideology.113  After discussing at length 
the legal distinction between patents and authors’ rights, Peretersky conceded 
the need for different terms and legal protection regimes, though the goal, in 
principle, was a single unitary system.114
Peretersky’s Marxist critique of copyright law illuminates how Soviet 
theorists balanced individual versus what they considered new social rights.
   
115  
According to Peretersky, the state had rights to the given work because the 
actual creator of the work was not merely the individual author, but also the 
social medium in which he or she worked.116  Next, since copyright, like all 
law, was not a logical but a historical construct, copyright law had to take into 
account relevant economic relations of production and the social utility of 
given works.117  However, it is remarkable to observe the workings of the 
NEP and the hold of the capitalist mindset, as Peretersky concludes that 
defense of authors’ rights was necessary to protect the incentives for the creation of 
works—a proposition completely incompatible with Marxist thought.118  
Thus, Peretersky proposed reintroduction of all Imperial-era rights, such as 
the author’s right to prevent alteration of his/her “mental child,” the right of 
reproduction, the right of compensation for takings, and so on.119  To the 
extent that the government retained rights, these had to be limited so that the 
state could not seize works for commercial benefit.120
 
110 Id. 
  With respect to the 
objects of copyright, Peretersky suggested sweeping categories, including 
traditional works, but also new works stemming from the introduction of film 
(Peretersky suggested copyright over plotlines to films, whether they were 
111 Id. at 93-94. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 94. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 95. 
116 Id. at 95. 
117 Id. at 94-95. 
118 Id. at 95. 
119 Id. at 96. 
120 Id. at 97. 
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written or not).121  Lastly, Peretersky suggested the introduction of a uniform 
template publication agreement (between publishers and authors) modeled on 
the Swiss contract code of 1911, subjecting publication contracts to the 
statute of frauds.122
Peretersky’s discussion elided conflicts of laws issues and international 
treaties, but these became major points of contention in subsequent writings.  
With economic growth came the decree of 1925 which established longer 
duration terms,
   
123 but maintained the widest possible state use and public use 
exceptions, such as translation of foreign works without compensation and so 
forth.124  The Soviet Union took a favorable position on the Berne 
Convention (continuing the Imperial legacy).125  The Berne treaty regime was 
affirmed in bilateral treaties with a number of European states.  For example, 
the Soviet-German treaty ‘on the defense of industrial property’ dated 
October 12, 1925 required the USSR to apply German law and IP protections 
in dealings with German citizens and firms.126  Despite recognizing the Berne 
protections, the Soviet Union entered into a number of separate agreements 
where the USSR claimed broad state-use exemptions in the “use of the 
technical and cultural heritage of the West,” justified by Korovin by reference 
to the “[Soviet] material and cultural paucity.”127
The 1925 set of fundamental principles on authors’ rights were expanded 
in 1928, and ultimately codified in the Law on Author’s Rights of October 8, 
1928.  Pursuant to this law, the author’s right expanded from 25 years from 
the date of publication or presentation, to the life of the author, plus fifteen 
years after the author’s death.  In the opinion of Soviet jurists, these copyright 
terms were entirely consistent with international norms.
   
128  Soviet jurists were 
of equal opinion on the related harmonization process with respect to 
trademarks and patents.129
 
121 Id. at 97. 
      
122 Id. at 99. 
123 WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN RUSSIA xiv (4th ed., 2005). 
124 John N. Hazard, Notes on Economic Law, supra note X, at 90. 
125 Korovin, CPIL, at 100. 
126 Id. at 99. 
127 Id. at 100. 
128 See id.   
129 NEP and post-NEP Soviet legislation fully protected domestic and foreign trademarks in 
accordance with bilateral and general principles outlined in international agreements.  Writing on 
trademarks in 1924, S.I. Raevich began his article with a note on how “fortunate” it was that 
trademarks received sufficient legislative attention both during the period of war communism and the 
NEP and remarked how consistent Soviet patent legislation was with European standards.  С.И. 
Раевич, О товарных знаках по советскому праву, 12(6) СОВЕТСКОЕ ПРАВО 64 (1924) [S.I. Raevich, 
On Trademarks in Soviet Law, 12(6) SOVIET LAW 64 (1924)].  With the adoption of the law “On 
Patents on Inventions” in 1924, the committee on inventions under the Supreme Soviet of the 
National Economy (ВСНХ СССР) continued functioning, but its prerogative was greatly restricted 
to issuing applications, licenses for the use of models, shop drawings and trademarks.  Dovgan’, 
supra note X, at 1.  The patent system introduced in 1924 created a patent bureau and required users 
to obtain permission of the patent owner prior to using the invention.  Id. (citing ВСНХ СССР №11 
от 25.11.1925). 
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In fact, by 1935, Pashukanis dropped any opposition to international 
conventions for the defense of industrial or property rights.130  In formalist 
fashion, he wrote about the International Council for the Defense of 
Industrial Property rights founded in Berne in 1883 (pursuant to the 1883 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property).131  To 
Pashukanis, these “special questions of international law” and international 
administrative unions were to be analyzed based on a concrete estimate of 
their expected utility.132  He saw no danger or conflict between these special 
treaty bodies and overarching Soviet principles, so long as they did not signify 
the wholesale adoption of bourgeois systems or were conflated into the 
League of Nations.133
Whereas to the early Pashukanis, the debate over property concerned the 
basic form/substance distinction and the legal notion of property (including 
socialist property concepts in Soviet law) was but a sham for what was in 
essence, bourgeois law,
    
134 by the late 1920s scholars like Korovin succeeded in 
showing that it was permissible to use seemingly bourgeois constructs during 
the transition stage to communism.  Both Korovin and Pashukanis reconciled 
the seeming contradiction between intellectual property protection and 
Marxist theory by situating both in a broader international law and foreign 
policy dimension.  Whereas lesser figures like Dotsenko continued to struggle 
to create a theoretical distinction between private property and personal 
property—where private property was deemed to be that which was acquired 
as a result of commercial enterprise (as for instance, under NEP), and 
personal property was that acquired as a result of work in a communal 
enterprise (such as the Kolkhoz)135—Korovin’s transition theory and 
instrumentalism obviated the need to ground intellectual property discussions 
in theoretical terms.  Protecting intellectual property rights was indispensable 
to attract trade, and trade was indispensable to strengthening the Soviet state, 
full stop.  This position was solidly endorsed by Pashukanis’ successor Adreii 
Vyshinsky136
 
130 Е. ПАШУКАНИС, ОЧЕРКИ ПО МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМУ ПРАВУ 165-66 (Гос. Изд. Сов. 
Законодательство, 1935) [E. PASHUKANIS, ESSASYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-66 (State Publ. 
Soviet Jurisprudence, 1935)]. 
 and continued to serve as the basis for the Soviet “stability of 
laws” doctrine for the remainder of the Soviet Union.    
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 165. 
133 Id. at 164-165.  Pashukanis observed that Article 24 of the Statute of the League subordinated 
existing treaty bodies to the League.  However, aside from the expressed desire to see these bodies 
separate, Pashukanis offers no discussion of the interaction of the various administrative organs and 
the League.   
134 General Theory of Law and Marxism. 
135 Id. at 9. 
136 Michael Head, The Great Debates, at 27 (discussing Vyshinsky’s arguments in defense of law 
and ‘stability of laws’ by reference to property rights: “[Vyshinksky’s examples of the need for law] all 
concerned the protection of private property interests.  ‘To reduce law to policy would be to ignore such tasks 
confronting law as that of the legal defense of personal, property, family and inheritance rights and 
interests, and the like.’).   
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C. Late Soviet IP Protection: an Overview 
Having discussed the centrality of the property rights and vertical 
harmonization debates in the creation of the early Soviet state, it is worthwhile 
to explore the late or ‘classic’ Soviet treatment of IP law.  This section 
provides an overview of this phase of the Soviet IP regime, including the 
USSR’s participation in international conventions concerning intellectual 
property.   
 In the domestic realm, Soviet copyright law resembled European civil 
law authors’ rights protections, with a major distinction being the goal of the 
law.  From the Soviet perspective, Soviet copyright law sought to balance the 
rights between authors and ‘society,’ whereas Western law was seen as being 
unfavorably biased towards publishers against authors.137  However, despite 
this rhetorical position, Western commentators writing on Soviet copyright 
law stressed the similarities to European regimes.  Western comparativists 
routinely remarked on the Soviet’s relatively unremarkable, and even 
“unexciting,”138 distinctions with respect to Western copyright law, contrary 
to what one would expect from a socialist state.  Unlike Cuba’s complete 
disavowal of copyright law in 1969,139
On the international plane, the Soviet Union was a state party to the 
three principal conventions relating to authors’ rights from the mid-1970s:  
the Berne Convention on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as 
amended in 1971; the Universal Copyright Convention (“UCC”) as amended 
in 1971
 for instance, the Soviet Union fully 
ascribed to reigning international obligations throughout its existence 
(whether by conforming domestic law to international standards, or by joining 
the relevant treaties).      
140 (USSR ratified the UCC in 1973); and the 1971 Convention on 
Protection of the Interests of Producers of Phonograms Against the Illegal 
Reproduction of their Phonograms.  The major legal maneuver exercised by 
the USSR concerned its accession to the UCC in 1973.  The Soviet Union 
adopted the UCC before the 1971 Paris amendments to the UCC went into 
force,141 so as to avoid the 1971 amendments which gave authors greater 
exclusive rights to their work and significantly restricted legal licenses.142
 
137 Dietrich A. Loeber, “Socialist” Features of Soviet Copyright Law, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
297 (1984-85) (offering an excellent introduction to Soviet copyright law) [hereafter Loeber]. 
  
138 Id. at 298-302. 
139 Id. at 303 (quoting Fidel Castro Speaks, 214, 218 (1969)); cf Ley No. 14 de 28 de diciembre de 
1977, Ley del Derecho de Autor, available at 
http://www.cenda.cu/php/loader.php?cont=legis.php&tipo=2 (harmonizing Cuban copyright law 
with international standards).   
140 Universal Copyright Convention (as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971), with Appendix 
Declaration relating to Article XVII and Resolution concerning Article XI 1971, available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/.  
141 See Elst, at 82 n. 147. 
142 Id.  The most significant amendment made at the Paris diplomatic conference in 1971 
pertained to Article VI bis (1) & (2) relating to reproduction, public use, and transmission of works 
by radio.  See M.M. BOGUSLAVSKII, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:  THE SOVIET APPROACH 173 
26 Boris N. Mamlyuk [DRAFT  
 On February 21, 1973, six days before the USSR deposited its 
declaration of accession to the UCC, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR enacted a series of amendments to chapter IV of the 1961 
Fundamentals to bring the Soviet copyright law in line with the minimum 
requirements the UCC imposed.143
 Ultimately, in 1978 the USSR acceded to the Paris amendments, subject 
to a reservation granting liberal use of Soviet works by developing countries.  
The political justification for the USSR acceding to the treaties was explained 
in a separate letter (1978) from the USSR to the treaty body:    
 
Desirous of helping to create favorable conditions for the use of the works 
of Soviet authors by the developing countries for educational purposes, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to the application of the 
aforementioned Convention to the works of Soviets authors.144
With its accession to the UCC, scholars observed that a seemingly dual system 
of copyright law emerged.  For works published by domestic authors (or 
works by foreigners which were first published on USSR territory), the Soviet 
copyright legislation applied.  On the other hand, international law governed 
copyright rights for foreign works.  As analyzed by Michiel Elst, the 
consequences of this dual system of copyright were felt particularly in the 
limitations of copyright.
   
145
 This dual system had noticeable practical effects.  For instance, if a 
musical work of a Soviet writer had been publicly performed, it could be 
freely reproduced in a film or freely broadcast on radio and television.  On the 
contrary, public performance of a work by a foreign author did not subject the 
author to the free use exemptions or legal licenses of Soviet law; the author’s 
permission was required for the same uses.
  Thus, domestic authors’ rights were subject to the 
most far-reaching free uses and legal licenses, whereas those who fell within 
the purview of the UCC enjoyed broader protection.   
146  This was because the extent of 
fair use / legal license use in the domestic context was quite broad,147 
especially for educational or scientific purposes.148
 
(William Simons, transl., Martinus Nijhoff, 1988); see also Records of the Conference for Revision of 
the Universal Copyright Convention: Unesco House, Paris, 5 to 24 July 1971 (Unesco, 1973). 
  However, with the Soviet 
state often the copyright holder, and in many instances the ostensible 
143 See Elst, at 82-83. 
144 See id. (Universal Copyright Convention, with Appendix Declaration relating to Articles XVII 
and Resolution concerning Article XI 1952, UNESCO Convention Documents (letter from the 
USSR dated August 24, 1978). 
145 Michiel Elst, COPYRIGHT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND CULTURAL POLICY IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 95 (Leiden:  Nijhoff 2005) [hereafter Elst]. 
146 See Elst, at 95-99. 
147 Id.  It was also expanded domestically in 1973 to permit newspapers to reproduce any 
published report or scientific, artistic, literary, or oral work; either in the original or as a translation. 
See MICHAEL A. NEWCITY, SOVIET COPYRIGHT LAW 110-112 (Praeger, 1978).  This was used 
famously by Soviet literary journals to publish translations of Vonnegut’s Breakfast of Champions and 
Norman Mailer’s Marylin.  Due to highly-publicized protests from the West, the Soviet Union bought 
publishing rights to the works shortly thereafter.  Id. at 111.   
148 Id. at 112. 
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copyright encroacher, copyright issues in the domestic arena were mostly 
moot.149  With respect to traditional copyright protection issues (length of 
term, etc.), Soviet domestic implementation of the UCC was consistent with 
international standards.150  The term of protection was 25 years after the death 
of the author with remainder rights paid out to heirs, much like in capitalist 
states.151
Elst correctly notes that the foreign-domestic duality in Soviet copyright 
law was untenable.  However, when Soviet jurists recognized this discrepancy, 
their solution was to simply adapt the much broader free use standards found 
in Soviet copyright law to international law, and not vice versa.
  
152
With respect to actual enforcement of copyright claims against the Soviet 
Union, it should be noted that very few claims (foreign or domestic) actually 
proceeded through the Soviet judiciary.  Peter Maggs, in his introduction to 
the copyright volume of Soviet Statutes and Decisions explained that this was 
due to the realities and context of state publishing.
  In other 
words, consistent with the USSR’s political and cultural policy, reconciling 
‘fair use’ between Soviet law and international norms often meant adopting 
the wider fair use exemptions.  For purposes of the present analysis, this can 
be rephrased as rejection of vertical harmonization.  By insisting on its own 
legal standards, the Soviet Union was maintaining an exceptionalist posture on 
the issue of broad fair use protections.     
153  The limitation on who 
could actually publish authors’ works and control the revenues and royalties 
indeed presented a serious limitation on the free exercise of rights, although 
some transfers did occur.154  Moreover, in the domestic context, copyright 
infringement claims were limited by the remedies available to aggrieved parties 
through Soviet civil, labor and administrative law, representing the interplay 
between the three major characteristics of the Soviet system:  socialist 
property, economic planning, and the leading role of the Communist Party.155
By the mid-1980s advances in technology required the modernization of 
Soviet IP law (as in other countries) to reflect the challenge posed by new 
  
With respect to foreign claims, interpretation of obligations arising under 
international treaties was rare due to the small number of potential disputes 
involving foreign claimants.     
 
149 SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET CIVIL LAW: DE 
LEGE LATA AC FERENDA 420 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) (listing instances where copyright claims 
could not be invoked against the state pursuant to Soviet civil law limitations despite being 
enumerated as fundamental constitutional or traditional author’s rights). 
150 Loeber, at 299-300. 
151 Id. at 300 (“As to the property rights of the deceased—the royalties—comparative lawyers 
would expect some ‘socialist’ impact on the law, such as the denial of monetary benefits to an heir on 
the grounds that these would accrue to him as ‘unearned income.’  Soviet law, however, stops short 
of imposing such a limitation and conforms in this respect to capitalist practices.”). 
152 Elst, at 101. 
153 Loeber, supra note X, at 312 (citing 14 SS&D, at 5). 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
28 Boris N. Mamlyuk [DRAFT  
digital reproduction technologies.  During this time, like most legal systems, 
the Soviet system only sporadically investigated the challenges posed to 
copyright by technical advances.156
II 
   
RUSSIAN IP LAW (1992-2006): TRANSITION 
A. Change, Transplants and Harmonization 
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s IP regime underwent a 
radical series of transformations.  Generally speaking, they can be divided into 
three periods.  The first, lasting from 1992 to 1994 was a period of indigenous 
change, with law reform proposals originating from working groups 
established in the dying days of the USSR.  The second period, roughly from 
1995 to 2006 was a period of legal transplantation,157 and vertical 
harmonization.158  Vertical harmonization here characterizes the relationship 
between Russia and international trade bodies, like the WTO, as well as 
perception of more diffuse norms or general principles of international law.159 
This period is notable because it coincided with what Gianmaria Ajani 
identified as the second stage of transition and law reform in Russia, “marked 
by a more critical approach towards ‘paper laws’ and by a more conscious 
attitude towards the ‘Anglo-American thinking’ of legal advisers and of 
international financial institutions.”160
 Scholars have chronicled the evolution of Russia’s IP regime in 
exceedingly detailed accounts,
  Because IP reform in Russia followed 
other reforms, this period may also reveal how Russian policymakers 
internalized the lessons of preceding reforms in other substantive fields, if at 
all.  Lastly, the third period of IP reform corresponds to the adoption of Part 
IV of the Russian Civil Code on November 24, 2006 (effective January 1, 
2008)—intended to supersede all previous legislation relating to intellectual 
property and to bring Russian law into compliance with international 
obligations.   
161
 
156 Elst, at 109. 
 so there is no need to retell the reform 
process, save but in general strokes.  As a state successor to the USSR, the 
Russian Federation remained a state party to each of the treaties discussed 
157 See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(Edinburgh, 1974); Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige:  Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern 
Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 93 n.1 (1995).   
158 Peter Maggs, The Process of Codification in Russia: Lessons Learned from the Uniform Commercial Code, 
44 MCGILL L. REV. 281 (1999). 
159 See Larry Cata Backer, Introduction and Analysis, in HARMONIZING LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION: CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE, AND RESISTANCE 13 (Larry Cata Backer, ed., 
2007) (discussing vertical integration, and defining harmonization as the “effect of approximation or 
coordination of different legal provisions or systems by eliminating major differences and crating 
minimum requirements or standards.”). 
160 Ajani, supra note X, at 96. 
161 See generally Elst. 
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above.162  Aside from inheriting Soviet treaty obligations, the Russian 
Federation was also heir to a new Soviet intellectual property law which was 
to go into effect in the USSR in January 1, 1992, but actually went into force 
in the new Russian Federation in August 3, 1992.  This legislation lasted only 
one year, replaced by the Law on Author’s Rights and Neighboring Rights 
which went into force on August 3, 1993.163
In a clean break with the Soviet past, the 1993 Russian Constitution also 
recognized and protected by law ‘intellectual property’ as an aggregate of 
exclusive rights to the results of intellectual activity.
    
164  The use of the term 
“intellectual property” versus authors’ rights is significant as it was the first 
time the term was used in Russian legislation since the early 1920s.  As 
relevant to the discussion below, the Russian Constitution also enshrined 
additional limited guarantees with respect to mass information.  For instance, 
Article 29(4) provides:  “Each shall have the right to freely seek, receive, 
transmit, produce, and disseminate information by any legal means.”165  
Similarly, Article 29(5) provides that “The freedom of mass information shall 
be guaranteed.”  These rights must be interpreted in light of the copyright law, 
and vice versa, but Russian courts have yet to rule on any likely conflicts.166
Equally important, the 1993 Russian Constitution codified a monist 
conception of international law.
   
167
 
162 In 1994, Victor Chernomyrdin issued a governmental decree to clarify that Russian 
Federation inherited its international treaty obligations with respect to IP.  See Russian Federation, 
decree no. 1224/1994: О присоединении Российской Федерации к Бернской конвенции об охране 
литературных и художественных произведений в редакции 1971 года, Всемирной конвенции об авторском 
праве в редакции 1971 года и дополнительным Протоколам 1 и 2, Конвенции 1971 года об охране интересов 
производителей фонограмм от незаконного воспроизводства их фонограмм, November 3, 1994 (Russian) 
[Governmental decree no. 1224 from 1994, signed by Viktor Chernomyrdin, Regarding Russia’s 
Accession to the Berne Convention, UCC, and the 1971 Additional Protocols to the UCC], available  
http://www.copyrighter.ru/full/index.html?berne4.htm. 
  Article 15, section 4 proclaimed that 
163 WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION xvi 
(4th ed., London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 2005); ЗАКОН РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ОБ 
АВТОРСКОМ ПРАВЕ И СМЕЖНЫХ ПРАВАХ (Москва, Республика, 1993) [LAW OF RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION ON AUTHOR’S RIGHTS AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS (Moscow, Republic, 1993)]. 
164 See Article 44. 
165 W.E. Butler, RUSSIAN LAW 710 (2d ed., 2003) (providing English translation of 1993 Russian 
Constitution).  Similarly, Article 29(5) provides that “The freedom of mass information shall be 
guaranteed.”    
166 The above provisions respecting freedom on information have been interpreted to refer to 
the government’s duty to release information.  However, as explained fully below, this provision may 
also be read more broadly to suggest a protection of the means of access to mass information, such 
as the Internet.  For instance, such a broad protection may be employed to immunize Russian 
Internet service providers from their customers’ copyright violations.   
167 In the USSR, the relationship of treaties to municipal law was one of the most hotly-contested 
issues in international law.  The general consensus was that the act of ratification of a treaty by the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet was a special normative act imparting legal force to 
international treaty norms.  Another view held that transformation of to national legislation was 
necessary before an international treaty became part of municipal law.  Third, according to Article 21 
of the 1978 USSR Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of 
International Treaties, certain treaties became automatically binding upon incorporation pursuant to 
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general principles of international law, customary international norms and 
international agreements to which Russia is a party shall henceforth be 
constitutive norms of the Russian legal system.168  Pursuant to the plain 
language of Article 15, international treaties were elevated higher even than 
domestic legislation:  under Section 4, if an international convention 
contravenes other laws, then the international convention trumps domestic 
law.169  Article 15, section 4 itself did not stipulate whether international law 
requires national implementation, translation, transformation, or whether 
international treaties are self-implementing.170  Accordingly, the constitutional 
provision immediately became the locus of a major debate in post-Soviet 
international legal theory.171  This debate, by and large, has continued to the 
present day.172
Returning to the copyright law, the 1993 Law on Author’s Rights and 
Neighboring Rights was not well received by either Russian scholars nor 
Western observers.  While the law recognized individuals’ property rights in 
cultural and artistic works of their own creation, it considerably reduced the 
list of free uses, a longstanding custom in Soviet IP law.  Remaining free uses 
were defined much more narrowly than before and compulsory licenses were 
 
 
Article 21.  See W.E. Butler, Comparative Approaches to International Law, 190 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 
53 (1985).  
168 CONSTITUTION OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Art. 15, Official Government Publication 
(Russian), available at http://www.gov.ru/main/konst/konst11.html (“Общепризнанные 
принципы и нормы международного права и международные договоры Российской 
Федерации являются составной частью ее правовой системы. Если международным договором 
Российской Федерации установлены иные правила, чем предусмотренные законом, то 
применяются правила международного договора.” – “General principles and norms of 
international law, and international treaties to which Russian Federation is a party, are constitutive 
parts of Russia’s legal system.  If national law contradicts international treaties, then international law 
supersedes national legislation.”). 
169 Id. 
170 Гаврилов, В. В.. Теории трансформации и имплементации норм международного права в 
отечественной правовой доктрине. 2 МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 39-61 
(2001), available at http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=162606 [V.V. Gavrilov, 
Theories of Transformation and Implementation of International Legal Norms in Russian Legal Doctrine, 2 
MOSCOW JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW 39, 40 (2001).] 
171 Е. Т. Усенко, Соотношение и взаимодействие международного и национального права и Российская 
Конституция, 2 МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 16 (1995) [E.T. Usenko, 
Correlation and Interrelationship of International and Domestic Law and the Russian Constitution, 2 Moscow J. of 
Int’l L. 16 (1995)]; B.B. Гаврилов, Теории трансформации и имплементации норм международного права 
в отечественной правовой доктрине. 2 МОСКОВСКИЙ ЖУРНАЛ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА 39-61 
(2001) [V.V. Gavrilov, Theories of Transformation and Implementation of Norms of International Law Within 
Domestic Legal Doctrine, 2 Moscow J. of Int’l L. 39, 39-61 (2001)], available at 
http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=162606 (last accessed November 2, 2009). 
172 See K.N. Ratsiborinskaya, Application of International Law by Russian Courts, in RUSSIAN LAW:  
THEORY & PRACTICE 59 (2004) (attaché of the legal department, Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs); O.A. Ishchenko & E.G. Ishchenko, Implementation of International Law in Russian Legislation, 2 
RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 196 (2008); L.L. Ponomareva, International Law in Decisions of 
Russian Criminal Courts, 1 RUSSIAN LAW: THEORY & PRACTICE 52, 55 (2008) (citing Surgut District 
Court, Case No. 073/06, discussing court’s failure to consider international standards and extradition 
rules, and proposing legislative changes to require courts to explain analytical process in court 
decisions). 
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abolished altogether.173  From the West’s viewpoint, the 1993 law reform 
package lacked many of the basic elements found in Western practice such as 
the right to alienate and encumber intellectual property rights.174
The Russian civil code was incrementally amended in 1995 and 2004, to 
further conform Russian domestic law with evolving TRIPs
  Accordingly, 
the legislative package was quickly tabled for amendment.  Incidentally, this 
was to have positive consequences, as it allowed legislators to assess the 
impact of emerging information technologies and to compare similar reform 
projects then-being proposed in various jurisdictions, as well as 
internationally.   
175 and bilateral 
obligations.176  Generally speaking, the 1995 and 2004 reforms kept with 
longstanding Soviet practice and the civil law tradition.  Rights were based on 
the moral theory of authors’ rights; that is, an author has exclusive rights to 
use his works, including the rights of reproduction, distribution, 
“communication to the general public by cable,” and others (all referred to as 
the “property rights”).  The copyright law applied broadly to any work, 
whether or a technical, artistic, or other nature, and in all reproducible 
media.177  The 2004 reform also added to the list of exclusive rights an 
“Internet right”178
 
173 Elst, at 370-375. 
—that is, the right of “communication of a work in such a 
174 Id. 
175 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the 
Uruguay Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereafter TRIPs Agreement].  The text of the TRIPs 
Agreement can be found on the WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/trips.pdf. 
176 Закон Российской Федерации “Об Авторском Праве и Смежных Правах” [Law of the 
Russian Federation on Copyright and Neighboring Rights] No. 5351-1 of July 9, 1993, Ведомости 
Сьезда Народных Депутатов Российской Федерации И Верховного Совета Российской 
Федерации [Вед. РФ] [Bulletin of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation and 
Supreme Council of the Russian Federation] 1993, No. 32, Item 1242, amended by Federal Law No. 
110-FZ of 19 July 1995, Собрание Законодательства Российской Федерации [SZ RF] [Russian 
Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No. 30, Item 2866 (compiled translation available from 
Garant-Service, document no. 10001423) and Federal Law No. 72-FZ of July 20, 2004, Собрание 
Законодательства Российской Федерации [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 
2004 No. 30, Item 3090 (translation available from Garant-Service, document no. 12036318) 
(hereinafter collectively the Russian Copyright Law); Sergey Budylin & Yulia Osipova, Is AllofMP3 
Legal? Non-Contractual Licensing under Russian Copyright Law, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3 n.16 (2007) 
[hereafter Budylin & Osipova]. 
177 In addition to the general Law on Author’s Rights, there also exists a 1992 Law on the Legal 
Protection of Programs of Electronic Computers and Data Bases (as amended 24 December, 2004).  
Pursuant to this law, computer programs are treated as works of literature, and data bases, as 
collections.  The substantive provisions of the law are similar to the Law on Author’s Rights.  See 
W.E. Butler, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at xxii.  A Russian Agency for the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, Data Bases, and Integral Microcircuits was formed to register computer 
programs, data bases, and topologies and contracts assigning such (pursuant to the 1992 law on 
Computers and Data Bases, amended in 2004).  However, it is unclear how many computer 
programs were or are voluntarily registered with this agency.   
178 In 2006, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued an advisory opinion seeking to 
clarify the then-existing copyright law, delineate civil and criminal jurisdiction, procedure and 
evidentiary rules, and highlight the need for further reform as a result of challenges posed by the 
Internet.  See Supreme Court of the Russian Federation: О вопросах, возникших у судов при рассмотрении 
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way that it is accessible for any person in the interactive mode from any place 
and at any time at his choice (right of making available to the general 
public).”179  A limited fair use exemption was provided in Articles 20-24 
covering traditional cultural, educational and scientific uses.180
These reforms were meant to be evolutionary, to gradually modernize 
and bring Russian law into line with international norms.  However, aside 
from mandatory harmonization required by Article 15(4) of the Russian 
Constitution, Russia also sought to voluntarily harmonize its domestic IP 
regime with WTO-related IP norms.  How did Russia interpret these 
obligations?  To what extent did Russia succeed in coordinating its domestic 
legal regime with TRIPs?  We can analyze these questions through Russia’s 
evolving conceptions of fair use/free license in copyright policy.  Fair use is a 
useful analytical frame because it illustrates where a legal regime strikes the 
balance between individual rights to a given work and social or public rights.  
For instance, if during Soviet times legal doctrine avoided the term 
‘intellectual property’ altogether—criticizing it for not only its inaccuracy but 
for being bourgeois and exploitative
  Part IV of the 
Russian Civil Code was adopted in 2006 and became effective on January 1, 
2008.   
181—and provided fairly broad fair use 
exceptions to copyright, analyzing fair use in the post-Soviet context 
elucidates the continuities/changes between Soviet and post-Soviet 
sensibilities182
Prior to embarking on the fair use analysis, however, a review of the 
driving forces (domestic and international) behind the harmonization reforms 
is necessary.   
 towards intellectual property more broadly.   
B. Policy-Driven Harmonization (2000-Present)  
Effective January 1, 2008, Russia’s entire intellectual property regime is 
codified in a new Part IV of the Russian Civil Code.183  The stated purpose of 
Russia’s new Part IV of the Civil Code (hereafter “New Copyright Law”) was 
to bring Russian copyright law into line with international copyright norms.184
 
гражданских дел, связанных с применением законодательства об авторском праве и смежных правах, 
Plenum decision no. 15 of June 19, 2006 [On Questions Regarding the Application of the Copyright 
Law], available at http://www.supcourt.ru/vscourt_detale.php?id=4349. 
  
179 See Budylin & Osipova, supra note X, at 4 (this provision went into effect on September 1, 
2006, but has since been superseded by Part IV of the Russian Civil Code). 
180 1993 Law on Author’s Rights, Arts. 20-24 (author’s translation). 
181 W.E. Butler, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN RUSSIA X (4th ed. 2005).   
182 ‘Sensibility’ here refers to the opinions of legal scholars and policymakers regarding a given 
proposition.  Research has revealed no opinion polls, or ethnographic data, on the topic of 
intellectual property rights in the late 1980s and early 1990s from the perspective of Soviet citizens.  
The assertions, therefore, are based on logical inferences, doctrinal writings, and a small unscientific 
opinion sample from Russian colleagues.   
183 Alexander L. Makovsky, On the Fourth Part of Russia’s Civil Code, in CIVIL CODE OF THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, FOURTH PART 24 (Peter Maggs, Alexander Makovsky, eds., 2008) (offering a 
parallel English-Russian translation). 
184 R.F. Civil Code, Part IV, available at http://copyright.ru/ru/library (Russian). 
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The express goal was harmonization of Russia’s entire IP regime—not merely 
individual normative acts, but the entire regulatory and enforcement system—
with the standards set forth in multilateral conventions, namely TRIPS, but 
also other conventions.185  The law reform project followed more than ten 
years of advisory work from the U.S., the WTO and international IP 
organizations.186  The reform project was championed by a number of 
domestic actors, such as the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute and 
media industry groups, who sought to clarify the confusing maze of rights and 
obligations under previous legislation.  But a foreign lobby also took active 
part in shaping the new law.  A common overarching political reality for both 
camps was that perceived success/failure of the reforms would influence 
Russia’s accession to the WTO.187
1. WTO, TRIPs, & the American Lobby  
   
Russia’s long road to WTO membership began almost twenty-five years 
ago.  Even under the Soviet Union, it should be remembered, one of the first 
steps of the Gorbachev administration was to apply for membership to the 
GATT in August 18, 1986 and to participate in the Uruguay rounds, both of 
which were rejected by the West.188
 
185 V.N. Monakhov, Conference Presentation, “Mass Information in Internet:  Freedom and 
Responsibility,” Moscow State University, Faculty of Journalism (October 12-13, 2007).  A draft 
version of the present section was presented at the conference.  Sample treaties include the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (September 9, 1886, last amended 
1979) (In force in the Russia Federation since March 13, 1995); Brussels Convention Relating to the 
Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (May 21, 1974) (In force in 
Russian Federation since January 20, 1989); Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or 
Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods (April 14, 1981) (Revised at Washington on June 2, 1911, 
at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London on June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon on October 31, 1958 
and was added to in Stockholm on July 14, 1967); Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (March 20, 1883, last amended 1979) (In force in Russian Federation since August 12, 
2009); Patent Law Treaty (September 1, 2000)(Currently there are 62 signed parties. In force in 
Russian Federation since August 12, 2009); Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (October 29, 1971) (Currently 
there are 80 parties who have singes, Russian Federation in force since March 13, 1995); Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations (October 26, 1961) (In force in Russian Federation since May 26, 2003); Trademark 
Law Treaty (October 27, 1994) (77 signers, Russian Federation signed May 11, 1998); Washington 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (May 26, 1986) (Ten signers include 
Zambia, Serbia, Saint Lucia, Liberia, India, Guatemala, Ghana, Egypt, China, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina); WIPO Copyright Treaty (December 20, 1996); WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT) (December 20, 1996).  
  The Russian Federation re-applied for 
186 Ольга Плешанова, Гражданский кодекс разошелся с требованиями ВТО, Коммерсантъ 
(24.07.2006) [Olga Pleshanova, Civil Code Departs from Demands of WTO, Kommersant (July 24, 2006), 
available at, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=692256 (last accessed June 7, 2007). 
187 RUSSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, CULTURAL 
HERITAGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS, FESTSCHRIFT FOR MARK M. 
BOGUSLAVSKIJ (A. Trunk, R. Knieper, A.G. Svetlanov, eds., Berlin, Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 
2004). 
188 KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC 
ORDER 187 (Duke, 1987). 
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GATT membership in 1993, one year after the dissolution of the USSR.189  
Russia’s WTO accession process has been tumultuous, and reflects many of 
the broader anxieties about liberalization reforms in Russia over the past 
twenty years.  This is not the place to delve into the large literature on Russia 
and the WTO, 190 but a review of the debate over TRIPs191
 Russia’s IP regime first gained widespread global attention around the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, when a vocal opposition to Russian piracy, 
coupled with lax IP regulation, began to take shape in the West.
 and IP reform is 
necessary.   
192  The 
West’s criticism had several roots.  First, Russia’s large, highly-educated and 
technologically-savvy work force (diminished and, perhaps, emboldened by 
the “brain drain” of the 1990s) began to use the Internet to download vast 
amounts of copyrighted Western-sourced media, including video games, 
computer programs, film, music, and electronic books.  Second, around the 
late 1990s the rate of high-profile hacking, spamming and phishing attacks 
originating from Russia began to multiply exponentially.  These attacks raised 
public awareness of the danger posed by emerging technologies, especially in 
light of then-impending Y2K crisis.  A third publicized source of tension 
between America and Russia was America’s allegation that the Russian 
government was complicit in its public’s obsession with Internet piracy by 
completely disregarding its obligations to protect copyright with respect to 
new and emerging technologies.193  This was seen as due to weak enforcement 
mechanisms, corruption, low penalties, and “lack of education and training for 
law enforcement and judicial officers.”194
A common sentiment among Western observers in the early to mid-
2000s was that among the world leaders in global music piracy, Russia had 
 
 
189  Elmira Danelyan, Russia’s Long Journey to the WTO:  Whose Interests Will Be Served if Russia Joins 
the World Club?,  1:4 LANDSLIDE 52, 52 (2009). 
190 Chiedu Osakwe,  David Tarr, James Collins, Aleksey Shishayev, Uri Dadush, Russia’s Accession 
to the WTO, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (December 10, 2009), available 
at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1496; see also Jasmine 
Cameron,WTO Accesssion and Legal Tradition in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparative Case 
Study of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 11 J. OF EAST EUROPEAN LAW 1, (2004) (referring to a speech by Mike 
Moore, Director-General of the WTO at the Fifth Annual Russian Economic Forum on “Russia and 
the WTO: Reintegration in the World Economy” ¶2 (April 19, 2002) available at 
http://www.wto.org/french/news_f/spmm_f/spmm84_f.htm; Harry G. Broadman, Russian Trade 
Policy Reform for WTO Accession, WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPERS, V. 401, at 41, 51-53 (1999); see 
also Christian Broadbent & Amanda M. Mcmillian, Russian and the World Trade Organization: Will 
TRIPS be a stumbling block to accession? 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 519 (1998). 
191 The TRIPs Agreement, in concordance with the general WTO regime, prohibits intellectual 
property laws from offering any benefits to local citizens which are not available to citizens of other 
TRIPs signatories.   
192 See David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: a Comprehensive Approach for 
Western Plaintiffs, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1203, 1220 (2000). 
193 Id. at 1207-1212. 
194 Hearing to Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia: Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 107th Congress (April 11, 2002) (Statement of 
Thomas R. Pickering, Boeing). 
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one of the largest piracy problems, due to inadequate laws and inadequate 
enforcement mechanisms.195  Despite a computer-literacy and population rate 
that was a fraction of China’s, the Russian threat was perceived as equaling, if 
not exceeding, China’s.  This was partly due to China’s earlier adoption of IP 
regulations (China joined the WTO in 2001), but may also have reflected Cold 
War-era mistrust and apprehension.  Rhetoric from American industry groups 
like the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and political 
leaders bears this out.  In 2005, for instance, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT), stated 
that before he votes on Russia’s accession to the WTO, “many of us will have 
to be convinced that the Russian government is serious about cracking down 
on theft of U.S. intellectual property.”196  In addition to copyright claims, the 
U.S. contended that Russian law does not provide TRIPS-consistent 
protection against unfair commercial use of test data and other data submitted 
to obtain marketing approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical 
products.197  The 2006 annual U.S. Trade Representative ‘Section 301’ report, 
for instance, refers to deficiencies which include the “lack of an effective and 
deterrent criminal enforcement system[…], the lack of effective plant 
inspection [for optical media production and distribution] […]; the lack of 
civil ex parte search procedures; an extremely porous border; delays in criminal 
prosecutions and adjudications; and infrequent destruction of seized pirate 
goods.”198   
To overcome this impasse, in November 2006, U.S. and Russia signed a 
‘market access agreement’ requiring Russia to take action to address piracy, 
along with continuing law reform, before the Unites States would consent to 
Russia joining the WTO.199  In a side letter to the market access agreement, 
t
 
195 Michael Mertens, Thieves in Cyberspace:  Examining Music Piracy and Copyright Law Deficiencies in 
Russia at it Enters the Digital Age, 14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 139, 143 (2006) [citing The 
Recording Industry Commercial Piracy Report 2 (2004)]; see also Russia loses WTO bid as G8 begins, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5183892.stm (16 July, 2006), last visited September 6, 2007 
(describing Bush-Putin talks prior to G8 summit relating to enforcement of Russian laws against the 
piracy of American music, computer programs and DVDs). 
he U.S. singled out Russian optical media (CD, DVD) factories and Internet 
servers that manufactured or distributed foreign copyrighted works, calling on 
196 Bradley S. Butterfield, Kevin J. Mason, Joseph B. Payne, and Robert R. Trumble, Human 
Resources and Intellectual Property in a Global Outsourcing Environment: Focus on China, India, and Eastern 
Europe, 15 SPRING INT’L H.R. J. 1 (2006).   
197 Office of U.S. Trade Representative, 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, available at 
http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/econ/annual/2005%20USTR%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf (last 
accessed Fen 24, 2010). 
198 Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of 
Human Rights Note 218, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2008).  Helfer also refers to Gary G. Yerkey, Russia 
Needs to Do ‘Much More’ Before U.S. Will Sign Off On WTO Accession Agreement, 6 WTO REP. (BNA) 
No. 184 (Sept. 22, 2006). 
199 See Susan Butler, U.S. Labels Target Russian Music Site [AllofMP3.com], BILLBOARD 17 (January 
27, 2007); Office of U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet, Results of Bilateral Negotiations on Russia’s 
Accession to the World Trade Organization (November 19, 2006), available at  http://www.ustr.gov/. 
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the Russian government to aggressively target these offenders.200  In exchange 
for Russia’s agreement to step-up enforcement and to streamline the passage 
of Part IV of the Civil Code, the U.S. promised to provide further training 
and advisory support for the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and 
Trade.201
 Notwithstanding the market access agreement and assurances from 
Russian leaders, losses from IP infringement originating in Russia continue to 
rise.  An annual report compiled by the the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative pursuant to section 182 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 
provides a glimpse into the alleged losses from copyright infringement in 
countries like Russia.
   
202  In year 2009 alone, the estimated losses from Russian 
piracy of business software were nearly $1.9 billion.203  In sum, the American 
copyright industry estimates that it loses at minimum, an estimated $2.5 billion 
dollars to Russian piracy each year, and these figures do not include estimates 
for losses of records and music, motion pictures, entertainment software, and 
books.  Consequently, the United States Trade Representatives maintains 
Russia on its “Priority Watch List”.  By comparison losses due to Chinese 
piracy (with its significantly larger population and computer and internet 
access rates) amount to $3.5 billion.204
2. Russian Civil Code (Part IV) and Legal Licenses 
   
The following section outlines several substantive provisions relating to 
legal licenses / fair use, and compares them with established American fair use 
standards to determine the extent of likely actual harmonization.  The U.S. 
copyright law and fair use exemption are chosen as a functional equivalent205
 
200 Office of U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement - Side 
Letter on Intellectual Property Rights (November 19, 2006), available at 
http://ustraderep.gov/assets/World_Regions/Europe_Middle_East/Russia_the_NIS/asset_upload
_file148_10011.pdf; U.S.-Russia Bilateral Market Access Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights, 
available at, http://ustraderep.gov/Trade_Sectors/Intellectual_Property/Russia/Section_Index.html. 
 
for the rich number of cases interpreting and applying the fair use doctrine 
201 Id. (Side Letter from Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Russian Federation, 
German Gref, to U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. Scwab dated November 19, 2009). 
202 The “Special 301” Report is an annual review of the global state of intellectual property rights 
(IPR) protection and enforcement, conducted by the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) pursuant to Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended by the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (enacted 
in 1994).  See 19 U.S.C, Ch. 12 § 2101 et seq. 
203 These statistics are compiled by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and 
incorporated into the Special 301 Report.  See IIPA 2010 ‘Special 301’ Recommendations, available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301LOSSLEVEL.pdf.  By comparison, the 2008 losses 
from Russian piracy of business software were nearly $2.8 billion (and $2.3 billion in 2007).  Globally, 
annual American losses due to IP violations amount to more than $100 billion, according to one U.S. 
trade group, the Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy (headed by NBC VP Rick Cotton).  See 
Darrell A. Hughes, NBC VP: US Needs Intellectual-Property Rights Protection Plan, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (February 18, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100218-
714295.html.   
204 Id. 
205 See Graziadei, supra note X. 
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and the dominance of the U.S. approach in international IP regulation 
regimes.  Copyright infringement claims in Russia and the U.S. also often arise 
from similar factual circumstances, especially in cases involving copyright 
infringement on the Internet.     
Article 1245 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (all subsequent 
article references are to the New Copyright Law) governs the reproduction of 
copyrighted works in the form of “home copies”—limited copies of 
copyrighted musical works for private use.  Even “home” reproduction of 
such musical works must be compensated.  As before, copyrighted musical 
works are protected more strictly than other audiovisual electronic works, 
notwithstanding the fact that currently, more and more books, academic 
materials, and other works containing scientific, artistic, photographic or other 
non-musical works take the form of electronic (easily reproducible) works.  
The distinction between musical and other audiovisual electronic works made 
in Article 1245 illustrates the ambiguity of the current scheme.  Thus, 
traditionally protected right to “home copy” musical works for personal 
archive needs is eliminated, while allowing home reproduction of non-
phonographic or non-musical works.  Such ambiguities abound in the new 
law.   
Article 1266 protects authors’ rights to prohibit alterations of their 
works.206
Article 1273 provides for a limited “private use” exemption.  Pursuant to 
this Article, reenactment of a copyrighted work is permitted so long as it is 
strictly performed for private use.
  Pursuant to this law, the author’s written permission is required to 
make any additions, alterations, deletions, provision of illustrations, to issue a 
preface, postscript, or add comments or explanations to a text.  In short, all 
alterations of a work are prohibited without the author’s express consent, save 
the separately preserved right for parodies and caricatures.  This Article marks 
a strong departure from the previous right against alteration.  Currently, the 
author’s right to his/her “reputation” is invoked solely in instances where the 
alterations may have caused an infringement on the author’s reputation or 
honor.   
207
 
206 These rights are properly titled the rights of inviolability over a given copyrighted work (права 
на неприкосновенность произведения). 
  However, similarly to Article 1245 (Right 
to “Home Copy”), the private use exemption is ambiguous on its face.  
Applied to the Internet context, the provision becomes doubly unclear.  First, 
the term “reenactment” (воспроизведение) does not clearly define a 
particular set of permissible rights/acts.  Secondly, “private use” is notoriously 
fuzzy when applied to the Internet.  For instance, is posting a clip of 
copyrighted music on a private Internet message board so that the individual 
207 See Статья 1273 (Свободное воспроизведение произведения в личных целях допускается 
без согласия автора или иного правообладателя и без выплаты вознаграждения 
воспроизведение гражданином исключительно в личных целях.) [Article 1273 (The free right of 
reproduction for private use is allowed without the permission of the author or the holder of author’s 
rights and without compensation.)]. 
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can enjoy clips of such music remotely considered private use, or does the fact 
that the music clip is reproduced and hosted on a remote server sufficient to 
constitute illegal reproduction? 
Article 1274 contains a limited “cultural use” exemption.208  This section 
provides a legal license for free use of copyrighted material in “informational,” 
scientific, educational or cultural contexts.  Although the educational/cultural 
exemption seems broad, the exemption itself is subject to several very broad 
limitations.  For instance, pursuant to Article 1274, section 2, libraries may 
lend electronic versions of copyrighted works (CDs, DVDs, VCR cassettes, e-
books) only so long as the works are viewed in library facilities, under 
conditions making reproduction impossible.  Immediately, such a limitation 
bans legitimate educational/cultural uses of films and musical works in the 
home or classroom context.  Clearly, the limitation on libraries’ rights to lend 
cuts deeply into the educational and cultural prerogatives of the libraries, 
namely the free and reasonable dissemination of knowledge and 
literary/cultural works.209
Article 1275 echoes the restrictive and outdated spirit of Article 1274.  
This article grants libraries the right to reproduce one copy of a copyrighted 
work without compensation for purposes of archiving the given work.  Like 
Article 1274, Article 1275, section 2 contains a draconian limitation, 
prohibiting the reproduction or storage of reproduced works via electronic 
means.
  Moreover, beyond restricting citizens’ longstanding 
rights to fair, uncompensated use of copyrighted works via the libraries, the 
article arguably infringes on legitimate, constitutionally-protected rights to 
access information, especially of those who are unable to travel and/or visit 
libraries.   
210
 
208 See Статья 1274 (Свободное использование произведения в информационных, научных, 
учебных или культурных целях.) [Article 1274 (The free use of copyrighted works for 
informational, scientific, educational/teaching and cultural purposes).]. 
  In other words, libraries may reproduce works via facsimile with 
[…] 
2. В случае, когда библиотека предоставляет экземпляры произведений, правомерно 
введенные в гражданский оборот, во временное безвозмездное пользование, такое 
пользование допускается без согласия автора или иного правообладателя и без выплаты 
вознаграждения. При этом выраженные в цифровой форме экземпляры произведений, 
предоставляемые библиотеками во временное безвозмездное пользование, в том числе в 
порядке взаимного использования библиотечных ресурсов, могут предоставляться только в 
помещениях библиотек при условии исключения возможности создать копии этих 
произведений в цифровой форме.   
[2.  When a library offers samples of works that have been legally introduced into public use, for 
temporary non-profit use, this use is allowed without the consent of the author, the holder of the 
author’s rights, and without compensation.  Electronic copies of works, including works introduced 
for reciprocal use of resources, may be lended only in the library facilities and under conditions 
prohibiting the possibility of creation [reproduction] of these works in digital form.]   
209 See Janice T. Pilch, Fair Use and Beyond: The Status of Copyright Limitations and Exceptions in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, 65(6) COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES  468–504 (November 
2004) (discussing the evolution of fair use in Russia between the 1995 and 2004 legislation). 
210 See Статья 1275 (Свободное использование произведения путем репродуцирования) 
[Article 1275 (Free use of works using reproduction). 
[…] 
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the aid of any technical devices, but so long as the devices do not yield 
electronic copies of the works.   
To put it mildly, the “one analog copy” rule is a relic of an analog past.211  
Moreover, this rule, far from enabling a vibrant multi-media academic 
atmosphere, stifles research, by reducing legitimate fair electronic uses to 
paper reproductions.212
Article 1276 codifies a limited “public domain exemption.”
  The practical effect of Articles 1274 and 1275 read 
together is shocking.  Schools are permitted to reproduce paper excerpts of 
given texts, but may not distribute identical excerpts in electronic form to 
students.   
213
2. Russian Legal Licenses v. U.S. ‘Fair Use’ & Berne Convention 
  Pursuant 
to this provision, if an architectural or artistic object is in the public domain, 
reproductions may be made of it and distributed via airwaves or via electronic 
means.  As with the foregoing limited copyright exemptions, the scope of this 
exemption in the Internet context remains unclear.  Nevertheless, this 
provision offers substantive justification for an expanded conception of free 
licensed use on the Internet.  Thus, photographs of copyrighted works which 
are found in public squares may be broadcast on the Internet.  However, it is 
unclear whether reproductions of copyrighted works appearing in publicly-
accessible museums would fall within this exemption.  As will be analyzed 
below, this positive provision should be interpreted to allow distribution of 
works in all public (i.e., public squares) and quasi-public (i.e., museums) 
domains via electronic means such as the Internet. 
As shown above, the New Copyright Law seeks to bring Russian law 
into line with strict international copyright norms.  Consistent with the Berne 
three-part test, the New Copyright Law provides only the most limited legal 
licenses or so called “fair use” exemptions to copyright.  The following 
section shall compare the legal licenses afforded by Russian law with the right 
 
2. Под репродуцированием (репрографическим воспроизведением) понимается 
факсимильное воспроизведение произведения с помощью любых технических средств, 
осуществляемое не в целях издания. Репродуцирование не включает воспроизведение 
произведения или хранение его копий в электронной (в том числе в цифровой), оптической 
или иной машиночитаемой форме, кроме случаев создания с помощью технических средств 
временных копий, предназначенных для осуществления репродуцирования. 
[2.  Reproduction (reprographic reproduction) is understood to mean fascimile reproduction of a 
given work with the help of any technical device, aside from the initial production.  Reproduction 
does not include reproduction or storage of copies in electronic (including digital), optical or other 
machine form, except in instances of creation with the aid of technical devices of temporary copies, 
for the purpose of reproduction.] 
211 Pnina Shachaf and Ellen Rubenstein, A Comparative Analysis of Libraries’ Approaches to Copyright: 
Israel, Russia, and the U.S., 33:1 JOURNAL OF ACADEMIC LIBRARIANSHIP 94–105 (2006). 
212 For instance, Article 1275, section 1, subsection 2, provides that reproductions of excerpts of 
copyrighted works may be made upon request from private citizens, but also for 
educational/scientific uses.  This is a subtle but drastic departure from the existing law which 
contains language seemingly allowing entire works to be reproduced for educational use.  
213 Статья 1276. Свободное использование произведения, постоянно находящегося в месте, 
открытом для свободного посещения. [Article 1276  (uncompensated use of likeness of work 
located in a public place)]. 
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to “fair use” embodied in U.S. copyright law.   
 The “fair use” exemption to the U.S. Copyright Act is codified in 17 
U.S.C. section 107.214
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;  
  Section 107 also sets out four factors to be considered 
in determining whether or not a particular use is fair: 
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;  
(3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole;  
(4) and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.215
All four of these factors require fact-based analysis, and require a court to 
look at the specific work at issue and the surrounding circumstances of its 
copying to determine whether an infringement has occurred.
   
216
[T]he “fair use” defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas 
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain 
circumstances. . . . The fair use defense affords considerable latitude for scholarship 
and comment.
  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated in one of its most recent copyright decisions: 
217
The scope of this “considerable latitude” is varied in U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the scope allows for a wide 
range of ostensibly permissible uses, with only the risk of post-facto sanctions 
for copyright infringement.  In other words, rather than providing a strict 
positive enactment of permissible uses, the U.S. copyright law establishes a 
flexible retroactive “fair use” limitation.
   
218  In over 150 years of common law 
litigation (prior to codification in 1976219
 
214 “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research, is not an infringement of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004).  The U.S. Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1976, modified several aspects 
of U.S. copyright law to harmonize with the requirements of the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971) 
and entered into force on March 1, 1989.  The Berne Implementation Act granted limited moral 
rights to authors of visual works within complex limits, but did not modify the ‘fair use’ regime.  
), this system has proven flexible yet 
procedurally and substantively fair by forcing plaintiffs to guard and enforce 
215 FL-102, Revised July 2006, US Copyright Office, www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html (last 
accessed on May 11, 2007). 
216 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994) (“[Fair use in copyright] is 
not to be simplified with bright-line rules,” but rather in “case-by-case analysis” in which the four 
factors “are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright 
[and the equities].”); see also WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 261-
65 (2nd ed., 1995). 
217 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220 (2003) (emphasis added). 
218 See generally Gervais, Daniel J., Towards A New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse 
Three-Step Test, 9 MARQUETTE INT. PROP. L. REV. 1, 10 (Spring 2005) [hereafter Gervais, Reverse 
Three-Step Test]. 
219 The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 was a comprehensive revision of the 1909 Copyright Act.  It 
became effective on January 1, 1978.  
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their rights.220
There are a number of practical consequences of this “reverse” 
approach.  First, it gives private individuals and educational/cultural 
institutions the right to independently assess their own conduct and develop 
unique policies for non-infringement, based on their own capacities for risk, 
litigation, etc.  Thus, educational bodies such as universities may interpret the 
first factor in the “fair use” test—whether the use is for a commercial purpose 
or a non-profit educational purpose—rather broadly (perhaps as a dispositive 
factor), and opt to provide clearly copyrighted material to their students under 
the guise of “fair use”.
 
221
The Russian legal licenses provided in the New Copyright Law 
correspond to the “fair use” standard found in U.S. copyright law.  Major 
categories of historically protected use are respected in the New Russian Law.  
Thus, the major academic rights are adequately protected:  the right to use 
excerpts of works in an academic setting; the right to create an archival 
reproduction of copyrighted works; the right to reproduce works for 
“personal use”.  In the traditional print and durable media context, these 
major rights are uncontroversial.   
   
Nevertheless, with respect to emerging technologies, the positive limited 
legal license approach is unworkable.  For instance, one can imagine myriad 
legitimate educational uses of copyrighted musical or film works in the home 
or classroom setting.  Accordingly, many U.S. libraries with flexible 
interpretations of the “fair use” standard allow their borrowers to rent 
copyrighted musical works, videos, DVDs, etc. in furtherance of their 
educational/cultural missions.  Of course, certain other U.S. libraries do not 
have faith in the purely educational motives of their patrons and restrict 
borrowing of these materials out of fear that the materials are being illegally 
reproduced.222  The important point, however, is that these libraries have an 
independent right to interpret their patrons’ habits and devise policies which 
they feel adequately embody true “fair use”.  In other words, there is a 
freedom to make new technologies available, but the freedom imposes on 
libraries, and their borrowers, the responsibility to use the technologies in a 
responsible, copyright-friendly manner.  Depending on their preference for 
risking copyright infringement lawsuits, libraries can adapt to completely new 
technologies (providing copyrighted works via electronic means to their 
patrons) or opt in favor of tried and true paper book lending models.223
 
220 cf D. Nimmer, ‘Fairest of them All’ and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBLEMS 263 (2003) (describing inconsistency in applying the ‘fair use’ standard). 
  As a 
221 Indeed, this is the rationale employed by multiple major research universities in the United 
States (such as the University of Michigan) for allowing the Google Books project to scan, copy and 
reproduce their entire collections.   
222 I draw on my personal experiences with public, private, academic and general use libraries in 
the U.S. and experiences with libraries in Russia.   
223 For instance, the Cornell University library system (along with several other American Ivy 
League universities) currently allows patrons to request portions of copyrighted works to be 
electronically imaged and sent to the borrowers via e-mail.  This benefit is intended to serve Cornell 
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result, new technologies are used in innovative and efficient ways, 
contributing to broader dissemination of the original copyrighted work in 
question.   
The new Russian model employs a completely different approach.  By 
banning libraries from reproducing works in electronic form, Articles 1274 
and 1275 reduce libraries to traditional book lending institutions, without 
much opportunity to become more.  Not only are these acts unenforceable, 
but they unnecessarily inhibit innovation towards the development of more 
efficient library models.224  Likewise, the new acts seem to outlaw existing 
innovative technological library projects such as the Open Russian Electronic 
Library225 of the Russian State Library or the digitization efforts started by the 
Russian State Library in 1999 (ADAMANT project).226  Cases like ZAO 
Kommersant, Publishing House v. ZAO Public Library & OOO Vector Info will likely 
be resolved even more forcefully against private companies wishing to 
establish limited public access online libraries.227
More generally, in the words of one commentator, “fair use is a much 
more flexible and adaptable doctrine with respect to new forms of use than 
purpose-specific exception, most of which are not technologically neutral.”
 
228
 
scholars residing away from the main Ithaca, NY campus.  The borrower of course assumes the duty 
to use the work in ways consistent with U.S. copyright laws. 
  
This is not to say that the current “fair use” standard in American law is fully 
workable or theoretically sound with respect to alleged Internet copyright 
violations; it is not.  The only real advantage of the fair use standard is its 
relative flexibility.  Scholars know that they may use works “fairly” and act 
fairly according to their own meanings of what is “fair”.  One student 
standing at a Xerox® may copy 5 pages of a textbook and deem it fair; 
224 Gevorkyan v. Moshkov, http://lenta.ru/news/2005/03/31/lib/. 
225 Откыртая русская электронная библиотека, http://orel.rsl.ru (last visited September 17, 
2007) [with over 8,655 online books]; see also National Electronic Library, at 
http://rusnel.ru/index.php (last visited September 17, 2007) [providing free access to multiple 
current copyrighted literary works (i.e., 10 of Boris Akunin’s stories and plays, etc.)].  It should be 
noted that in its charter, the National Electronic Library requires member libraries and contributors 
to the electronic fund to be copyright holders or to act pursuant to the Law on Author’s and 
Neighboring Rights.  See Section 1.1, Legal Basis, Charter of Russian Electronic Library, available at 
http://rusnel.ru/conception.htm (last visited September 17, 2007). 
226 The ADAMANT project was started in 1999 with the goal of digitizing (creating digital 
copies) of the entire Russian State Library collection, over 40 million works.  The ADAMANT 
project eventually evolved into the Open Russian Electronic Library and the National Electronic 
Library.  See http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/056-142e.htm (last visited September 6, 2007).  
227 V.B. Naumov, LAW AND THE INTERNET:  ESSAYS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE 199-205 
(Moscow: University Publishing House 2002).  The case involved a private for-profit company which 
included copyrighted material in its paid library without the copyright holders’ consent.  The court 
applied the law on libraries to the private company, holding that the company did not have a right to 
use the content.  The holding rested on several factors:  (1) the access to the website was on a 
subscription or paid basis; (2) the publication on the Internet differed from traditional library uses in 
that it was permanent.  A modern case involving similar “embedded” content with a “time-bomb” 
(file expires after certain time) would have probably passed the court’s scrutiny under the current law.  
However, under the New Copyright Law, this act would probably constitute infringement.   
228 See Gervais, Reverse Three-Step Test, at 27. 
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another may copy 5 books and deem it fair academic use.  Depending on the 
context, both instances may be legitimate fair use.  The key is that it is not 
necessary to draw bright lines, to impose page limits on copies, or to restrict 
the modes of reproduction.  Some students or professors may be caught 
copying books and may be forced to pay compensation, but most will know 
they have a reasonable right to copy, and more importantly, will continue to copy.   
However, compared to the relatively flexible “fair use” standard which 
may be litigated following particular alleged copyright violations, the legal 
license approach works the opposite way – it seeks to enumerate specific 
rights that institutions have, but by doing so (and doing so ambiguously) it 
stifles the institutions’ rights to invent novel teaching techniques, experiment 
with new technologies in the classroom (multi-media teaching, playing films in 
cultural centers) etc.   
To be sure, these problems are not unique to Russia.  Nearly two 
decades of IP litigation in the US has not produced a workable “fair use” 
standard with respect to the copyright obligations of Internet service 
providers, Internet cataloguers, Internet encyclopedias and so forth.  
However, it is perhaps the failure to produce a comprehensive catalog of 
Internet rights and liabilities which has contributed to the dramatic growth of 
the information technology sector, and the Internet in particular.  As 
renowned Internet law expert Lawrence Lessig and others have argued, it was 
perhaps a great boon to the IT industry and to American pop culture that 
many of the most popular Internet uses remained in legal limbo, or in the gray 
shadow of legitimacy in the first decade of the Information Age.229  Even 
today, the most important issues of copyright law—the scope of the fair use 
exemption—are being tested and reshaped by Google (i.e., GoogleBooks) and 
numerous other Internet pioneers eager to stake legitimate legal claims to 
virgin Internet territory. 230
The Russian experience with Internet innovation has been equally if not 
more so spectacular since the early 1990s, precisely because of a similar legal 
uncertainty regarding the status of the Internet.  For this reason, sites like 
AllofMP3 sprung onto the international stage, gaining wide following.  
Russian Internet use surged and a vibrant lucrative information technology 
  Despite new legislation in the U.S. such as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (heightening penalties for copyright 
infringement on the Internet), U.S. law remains uncertain with respect to key 
copyright issues.  Not surprisingly, as the law remains uncertain, innovation 
continues. 
 
229 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2006), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freecontent/ (last accessed May 11, 2007). 
230 For instance, the right of search engines to display portions of other websites was extensively 
debated within academic circles in the early years of the Internet, with the courts ultimately ruling 
that search engine displays were permissible fair uses.  See Wikipedia, Google Book Search, available 
at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Book_Search (see fn. 18, noting that German court 
dismissed lawsuit against Google Book Search based on theory that Google’s display of portions of 
copyrighted work in Google Book Search engine was similar to search engines’ display of result data) 
(last accessed May 11, 2007). 
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sector was able to develop throughout Russia and the former Soviet Union 
countries, including smaller nations like Moldova.  Immediately after its 
launch in 2000, AllofMP3 became embroiled in domestic lawsuits by 
international firms, including the American RIAA (Recording Industry 
Association of America).  The disputes continued throughout the 2000s.  
Despite mounting international opposition, the legal theories being litigated 
before the local Moscow courts pointed to a growing appreciation among 
Russian jurists for American-style ambivalence in Internet law.231  Uncertainty 
in Russian law on non-contractual licensing is also encouraging.232
In June 2007, the site was shut down due to pressure from the Russian 
government.  Not coincidentally, the lawsuit by the RIAA was dropped 
shortly thereafter.
   
233
 
  Since 2008, the New Copyright Law has signaled the 
start of a new era in Russian Internet law, marked by increasingly detailed 
positive laws relating to property rights in non-traditional media, Internet and 
over products of intellectual activity.  Aside from an expected decrease in 
experimentation and innovation by information technology firms due to 
exposure to litigation risk, this new era is also marked by greater cooperation 
between Russia and Western firms in defense of these rights.   
* * * 
The forecast for the immediate future of copyright in Russian Internet 
law seems filled with challenges.  With the enactment of the New Copyright 
Law, Russia seems poised to take on an ambitious range of enforcement 
measures aimed at “cleaning up” its Internet, as well as its image with respect 
to copyright enforcement before the international community.  The end result 
promises to be harmonization between Russian, EU and broader international 
copyright law, all aimed at supporting Russia’s accession to the WTO.234
Will Russia need to further amend its New Copyright Law to conform to 
WTO standards?  It is doubtful that further law reform will be necessary, as 
the current law seems to codify the existing Berne three-step test
   
235
 
231 On August 27, 2007, a Moscow district court rules that AllofMP3.com operated within the 
law, http://www.allofmp3.ru/press.shtml (last visited September 17, 2007). 
 and is 
232 Budylin & Osipova, at 1. 
233 See Music Industry Drops Copyright Suit Against Russian Music Site, available at 
http://www.allofmp3.ru/press.shtml (last accessed September 24, 2009). 
234 Jasmine D. Cameron, WTO Accession and Legal Tradition in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights: a 
Comparative Case Study of Kyrgyzstan and Russia, 11 J. EAST EUR. L. 1 (2004). 
235 The Berne three-step test is a clause that has been included in several international treaties on 
copyright (notably the TRIPs Agreement, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the EU Copyright Directive 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty).  It imposes constraints on the possible 
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights under national copyright laws.  The most important 
version of the test is that included in Article 13 of TRIPs. It reads, 
Members shall confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to [1] 
certain special cases which [2] do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
[3] do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder. 
(The three steps have been italicized for emphasis.)   
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strictly applied in practice.236  Thus far, the scope of this three-part test has 
not been delimited on the international plane, and application of the test has 
produced only general guidelines.237  Furthermore, Russia has recently 
acceded to the WIPO Internet Treaties.238
Over the near term, one can expect that in the near term Russia will seek 
to further restrict fair use exemptions, particularly in the Internet context.  To 
effect enforcement, Russia may even experiment with new anti-piracy 
measures such as Internet trolls, restrictive firewalls, and similar measures 
currently used and being developed by governments like China to restrict 
Internet access.  With a large, highly sophisticated pool of information 
technology specialists, Russia is particularly well-equipped to experiment with 
disastrous Internet monitoring measures under the guise of copyright 
enforcement.  The threat of such measures for media and particularly Internet 
freedom in Russia cannot be understated, especially in light of Russia’s 
historical experience with state censorship and restrictions on information 
flows.      
 
The New Copyright Law accomplishes exactly what its writers set out to 
do—it marks a complete break with any vestiges of Soviet thought that were 
remaining in the 1993 Law on Author’s Rights (such as the broad 
academic/cultural use exemption) and harmonizes Russian law with existing 
international copyright norms.  As has been argued elsewhere,239 instead of 
developing workable parameters for copyright exceptions for the Internet or 
invoking new technologies which mitigate the threats against copyrights,240
 
236 Research has not produced a sufficient number of Russian cases interpreting the New 
Copyright Law.  Therefore, the analysis regarding likely application in practice based on first hand 
empirical research and discussions with Russian IP attorneys and scholars.   
 
the New Copyright Law, rather than drawing a flexible line between 
copyrights and exceptions—freedom and responsibility—can have the 
unintended consequence of chilling the exercise of free speech.  As a result of 
the strict New Copyright Law and out of fear of litigation, companies, 
organizations and individuals will be less likely to exercise their 
constitutionally protected speech and access to information rights not only in 
the Internet context, but also more generally.  Subsequent waves of IP law 
reform in Russia will most likely attempt to delineate previously ambiguous 
237 See Gervais, Reverse Three-Step Test, at 13-19 [analyzing application of three-part test to US 
Copyright Act by 2001 WTO panel]. 
238 The WIPO Internet Treaties refers to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).  The WCT and the WPPT entered into force on 
March 6, 2002, and May 20, 2002, respectively. See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO 
INTERNET TREATIES, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/ecommerce/450/wipo_pub_l450in.pdf. 
239 “Fair Use” In Russia’s New Internet Regulation Regime—A Law and Economics Perspective, 
Conference Presentation, “Mass Information in Internet:  Freedom and Responsibility,” Moscow 
State University, Faculty of Journalism (October 12-13, 2007).   
240 For instance, Digital Rights Management, or legal recognition of viable read-only alternatives 
to text versions of e-books (i.e., non-printable, non-copyable Adobe .pdf files – such as Антон 
Серго, ИНТЕРНЕТ И ПРАВО (2002), available at http://internet-law.ru/book/text/book_5.pdf. 
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rights.   
The significance of domestic reforms in the IP sector are symptomatic 
of several developments in Russian international legal theory.  First, they 
signify a general willingness to conform to customary and evolving 
international norms.  The clear delineation of property rights, as I have argued 
above, and the domestic implementation of international norms aimed at 
defending these rights, constitutes a core function of public international law.  
Russian international lawyers are fully aware that state relations are no longer 
confined to matters of war and peace, but increasingly encompass commercial 
concerns.  In Russia, economic practices and firm activity are perceived as 
having an impact on Russia’s image as a responsible economic actor.  The 
image of a predictable economic actor is also bolstered by actions which 
demonstrate predictable state action, and vice versa.  This means that, for the 
immediate term at least, Russia will continue its efforts to strengthen its IP 
regime, especially in high-profile copyright infringement cases.    
C. Policy Tradeoffs, Resistance, Values and Interests   
The historical outline provided above allows us to draw several 
normative lessons.  First, and most significant, the WTO’s continued 
opposition to Russia’s accession has had the very real effect of forcing Russia 
to explore alternative economic integration arrangements, often along lines 
resembling the previous Soviet economic union.241  Russia’s surprise 
announcement in July 2009 that that it intended to accede to the WTO as a 
regional customs body along with Kazakhstan and Belarus (instead of as a 
state party) sent ripples of discontent in the international trade community.  
However, this resistance was to be expected.  Russian international law 
doctrine has been voicing these concerns for at least the past five years.242  
Leading Russian jurists involved in the IP harmonization efforts, like Victor 
A. Dozortsev, genuinely hoped that their efforts would be rewarded with 
WTO accession and were surprised, if not outright offended,243
 
241 HIROSHI ODA, RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL LAW (2nd rev. ed., Nijhoff, 2007). 
 when the U.S. 
242 Г.М. ВЕЛЬЯМИНОВ, МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЕ ПРАВО И ПРОЦЕСС § 588 
(Волтерс Клувер, 2004) (“Соответствующий договорно скрепленный синдром 
безответственности питает отчасти, наряду с прочими мотивами, и американское 
сопротивление формально давно назревшему приему России в ВТО, ибо в рамках этой 
организации придется отказаться от дискриминационной безответственности перед 
Россией.”) [G. M. VELYAMINOV, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND PROCEDURE § 588 
(WaltersKluwer, 2004) (“ The corresponding and contractually binding syndrome of irresponsibility 
[regarding the U.S.-Russian bilateral agreement absolving U.S. firms of liability in Russia] partially 
feeds into, along with other motives, the American opposition to Russia’s accession to the WTO, 
which is formally long overdue.  As a result, Russia will likely be forced to withdraw from the 
discriminatory treatment [of the WTO].”)].  Velyaminov, a professor of law and a chief researcher at 
the ISL, is one of Russia’s leading experts on international economic and trade law.   
243 Александр Л. Маковский, Американская История, 7(1) ВЕСТНИК ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА 
165-196 (2007) [Alexander L. Makovsky, American History, 7(1) VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA 
165-196 (2007)] (discussing the involvement of individual U.S. Senators during the development of 
Part IV, and personal dissatisfaction with their conduct); See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance 
Letter to Acting U.S. Trade Representative (April 14, 2005), available at 
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continued to stall Russia’s integration efforts.244  American demands that 
copyright violations be governed by criminal, rather than civil law, and that 
software programs carry patent protection rather than copyright, were 
extensively debated in the Russian working group, but ultimately rejected on 
policy grounds, such as the fact that no Western European state afforded such 
protections.245
Second, America’s insistence on further law reform—even after the 
passage of Part IV of the Civil Code—seems unlikely to resonate due to 
America’s failure to deliver on its promises (most significantly, dropping 
opposition to WTO accession).  For instance, in its 2009 ‘section 301’ report, 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative looks to Russia to make further 
progress by ensuring that the Russian Customs Code, Civil Code and Law on 
Medicines comply with the IPR Bilateral Agreement and the relevant TRIPS 
Agreement obligations that will take effect upon Russia’s accession to the 
WTO.
 
246
 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2005/prg041405.pdf  (letter from Sens. Chuck Grassley 
and Max Baucus concerning reservations about Russia’s accession to WTO due to IP infringement).  
Alexander L. Makovsky (b. 1930) is one of the leading civil law jurists in Russia and a renowned 
authority on intellectual property law.  He was the deputy chair of the working group that developed 
Part IV.  See also АЛЕКСАНДР Л. МАКОВСКИЙ, О КОДИФИКАЦИИ ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА (1922-
2006) (М: Статут, 2009) [Alexander L. Makovskii, On the Codification of Civil Law (1922-2006) 
(Moscow: Statute, 2009)], abstract available at http://www.estatut.ru/pdf/161209_02.pdf; А.Л. 
Маковский, Обращение к читателю, ВЕСТНИК ГРАЖДАНСКОГО ПРАВА (“Создание нового 
российского гражданского законодательства еще не завершено. Далеко не все в уже принятых 
и действующих законах себя оправдало — это и многие «американизмы» в корпоративном 
праве и нормативных актах от инвестиционных ценных бумагах, и крайне противоречивое 
законодательство о некоммерческих организациях, и многое другое. Ряд крупных законов 
нуждается в продуманном совершенствовании. Не является в этом отношении исключением и 
Гражданский кодекс.”) [Alexander L. Makovsky, Appeal to the Reader, VESTNIK GRAZHDANSKOGO 
PRAVA (“The creation of a new Russian civil code is not yet complete.  By far not all of the adopted 
and active laws were vindicated [by history]—along with a number of “Americanisms” in corporate 
law and normative acts on investments and negotiable instruments, and contradictory legislation on 
NGOs, and much else.  A series of major laws is in need of measured reevaluation, not excluding the 
civil code.”), available at http://www.mvgp.ru/full_obr/. 
  While these recommendations are certainly warranted, they are 
244 See generally ВИКТОР А. ДОЗОРЦЕВ, ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРАВА: ПОНЯТИЕ, СИСТЕМА, 
ЗАДАЧИ КОДИФИКАЦИИ (СБОРНИК СТАТЕЙ) (М.: Статут, 2005) [VICTOR A. DOZORTSEV, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CONCEPTION, SYSTEM AND PROBLEMS OF CODIFICATION 
(COLLECTED ARTICLES) (Moscow: Statute, 2005)].  Dozortsev (1928-2003) was one of the leading 
Russian jurists in the working group developing Part IV of the Civil Code.  See also   
245 Ольга Плешанова, Гражданский кодекс разошелся с требованиями ВТО, Коммерсантъ 
(24.07.2006) [Olga Pleshanova, Civil Code Departs from Demands of WTO, Kommersant (July 24, 2006), 
available at, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=692256 (last accessed June 7, 2007).  U.S. 
copyright law also provides mainly civil remedies, though the U.S. government may file criminal 
charges for any violation of the Copyright Act provided that such infringement is undertaken 
“willfully” and “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.”  17 U.S.C. § 506(a).  
However, the U.S. has moved more aggressively towards criminalizing copyright infringement, 
particularly to fight piracy over the Internet.  See, e.g., No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
246 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2009 Special 301 Report (April 30, 2009) 
available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20
301%20REPORT.pdf   
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increasingly perceived by Russian elites as disingenuous.   
 In contrast to the U.S., the EU has been consistently in favor of Russian 
accession notwithstanding Russia’s evolving IP regime.247  This may be 
reflected in the EU’s own complex process of standardization in the realm of 
IP throughout the 1990s.248
The underlying philosophy of standardization—to put ideas into the 
public domain—and the philosophy of intellectual property rights to 
maintain ideas or expression as private properties—are, to some extent, 
inconsistent and that [national] tensions between them could inhibit the 
rapid adoption of Community standards.
  The underlying rationale behind EU 
standardization in the IP domain is similar to any harmonization project:    
249
However, the EU proceeded with the understanding that actual de facto 
harmonization could only occur as the result of actual trade, contestation, and 
revision over a prolonged period of time.
   
250  The EU’s position on Russian 
intellectual property reform is informed by this pragmatic experience, and 
borne out by the harmonization reforms in former socialist countries that 
have since joined the EU.  The principal lesson of EU harmonization in the 
IP domain was that even as states adopt formal European Community 
directives, emerging technologies will continue to challenge traditional IP 
forms.251
Third, while there is a dissenting isolationist strain in Russian foreign 
policy discourse,
   
252 Russian leaders and elites are fully committed to the view 
that increasing economic and cultural interconnectedness (the process of 
globalization) is a good thing.  This thinking has been entirely consistent with 
the historical development of international law in the West253
 
247 For EU-Russia trade issues related to Russia’s accession to the WTO, see Rafael Leal-Arcas, 
The European Union and New Leading Powers: Towards Partnership in Strategic Trade Policy Areas, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 345 (2006); Despite Obstacles, EU Expects Russia to Join WTO This Year, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (June 2008), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgeweekly/12267/.  
 and in Russia 
since the collapse of communism.  The notion that individuals and firms have 
248 MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, RONALD S. LAURIE, LAWRENCE E. ELDER, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND EASTERN EUROPE ¶ 12.5 
(Prentice Hall & Business, 1993). 
249 Id. (citing European Commission, Communication on the Development of European Standardization—
Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 1991 (C 20) 1 [Green Paper], at 
25). 
250 See Larry Catá Backer, Harmonizing Law in an Era of Globalization – Convergence, Divergence, and 
Resistance: An Introduction and Analysis, in Harmonizing Law in an Era of Globalization 3-17 (Larry 
Catá Backer, ed., Carolina, 2007) (suggesting that harmonization and convergence is primarily the 
result of, and in furtherance of, economic activity). 
251 See Peter Smulders, The European Community and Copyright § 4[2], in INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller, ed., LexisNexis 2009).  
252 Вадим Цымбурский, Остров Россия, РУССКИЙ АРХИПЕЛАГ (2002) [Vadim Tsimburgskii, The 
Island of Russia, RUSSIAN ARCHIPELAGO (2002)], available at, http://archipelag.ru/ru_mir/ostrov-
rus/cymbur/island_russia/. 
253 BEIN STEIL, MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MARKETS & SOVEREIGNTY 11 (Council on Foreign 
Relations, Yale Univ. Press, 2009). 
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universal fundamental economic rights that transcend the will of national rulers 
has strong resonance in contemporary Russia.  As we saw in the historical 
overview, even during the Soviet period, the USSR subordinated its 
ideological posture to concrete economic realities.  Recent advances in 
economic analysis of international law254 are likely to validate this intuition.  
At the same time, Russian leaders are noticeably sensitive to what they 
perceive as American international trade gamesmanship, arrogance,255 and 
imposition.256  Russia has closed nearly all outstanding international aid 
projects and reform initiatives.257  Russia has also begun reassessing its 
reliance on Western economic models in the wake of the financial crisis, 
although what tangible changes will result remains to be seen.258
CONCLUSION 
 
 Despite ascribing to a communist ideology and professing an exceptional 
‘socialist international law,’ in the domain of international intellectual property 
law (specifically, copyright law), the Soviet Union consistently worked to 
harmonize its domestic law with general developments in international law.  
This was done to facilitate trade in material and intellectual property with 
Western powers.  Soviet international law scholars reconciled legal 
 
254 Alan O. Sykes, International Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 764 (Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds. 2007); JACK L. GOLDSMITH, ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford, 2005).     
255 Bureau Report, US Can Never Regain Its Status in Global Market: Putin, ZEENEWS (October 9, 
2008), available at http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=475091&sid=bus; see also VINCENT 
BARNETT, A HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ECONOMIC THOUGHT ix (London:  Routledge, 2005) 
(explaining Western economists’ view of Russian counterparts as “inferior”). 
256 Katherine Verdery, WHAT WAS SOCIALISM, AND WHAT COMES NEXT? 15, 18-19 (2002) 
(pointing out that a common theme in postsocialist writing is transferring Western institutions, such 
as markets and democracy, to non-Western settings 
257 World Bank Project No. P008831 (Russian Legal Reform Project) (June 13, 1996 to 
December 31, 2005), http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/; see also World Bank Report No. 
T-6883-RU, Appendix G (setting forth priority substantive areas of law such as international trade 
and property law).  The project was administered by the Russian Foundation for Legal Reform 
(RFLR), a governmental non-profit organization founded in April 1996 pursuant to Presidential 
Decree No.81 of February 2, 1996.  The founders were Administration of the President of Russian 
Federation, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice, Federal Commission on Securities and Stock 
Market of RF Federal Government, Russian Academy of Science.  The EU also participated in 
Russian law reform (Tacis Project EDRUS 9607) from December 1997 to March 2001.  
Strengthening the State of Law and Legal Education Under New Market Relations, Tacis Project 
EDRUS 9607, available at http://iipld.free.fr/edrus9607.htm (last accessed September 22, 2009).  
Smaller mainly European-funded law reform research projects continued in Russia through 2008, 
such as that administered by the Dutch Center for International Legal Cooperation.  See DUTCH 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COOPERATION, ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2007), available at 
http://www.cilc.nl/annualreport2007.pdf (three-year Matra-funded project to assist the 
harmonization of Russian civil and administrative procedure law ended in July 2008). 
258 Robert Jellinek, Russia and the Global Meltdown: Domestic and Foreign Policy Responses to the 
International Financial Crisis, CARNEGIE CENTER, available at, 
http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/booklet/11895Jellinek_Russia_and_the-Global_Meltdown.pdf.  
Jellinek’s analysis of Russia’s response offers an excellent introduction to Russia’s measures in the 
wake of the crisis.   
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harmonization with communist principles by employing a number of novel 
rhetorical and argumentative structures, such as: (1) the transition theory to 
justify temporary concessions and compromises; (2) international legal 
instrumentalism to justify the ends over the means; (3) de-politicization of 
substantive international law matters to make intellectual property protection 
a matter of administrative international law, and hence not subject to theoretical 
contestation with the West. 
 Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has implemented at least four 
major law reform projects in the IP domain (1993, 1994, 2004, 2008) to 
further harmonize domestic law with emerging international norms.  The 
latest round of reforms is intended to be a definitive domestic codification of 
Russia’s outstanding international obligations in the realm of intellectual 
property.  In anticipation of, and in furtherance of, WTO accession, Russia 
has harmonized its domestic legislation with all outstanding TRIPs 
obligations, including the WIPO Internet Treaties.  Comparative analysis of 
Russian copyright law with U.S. ‘fair-use’ standards reveals Russian copyright 
law to be as, if not more, stringent than its U.S. counterpart.   
 The WTO’s continued refusal to permit Russian accession is based, in 
part, on Russia’s lax enforcement of IP protections.  Considering that Russia 
has coordinated its formal domestic legislation with international norms, it is 
unclear how long Russia must wait to demonstrate acceptable levels of 
enforcement.  This ambiguous position has generated resentment among 
leading Russian policy-makers and jurists.  This is likely to hinder future 
reform projects, spawn further resistance to WTO mandated reforms, and 
interrupt the organic legal harmonization efforts underway in Russia.  
